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ABSTRACT 
Luke Gensler: Pots, Putty, and Wires: Croatian Separatist Terrorism and the Hijacking of TWA 
355 
(Under the direction of Robert Jenkins) 
 On September 10, 1976, five Croatian nationalist, led by Zvonko Bušić, hijacked TWA 
flight 355 shortly after it took off from New York. What followed was a thirty-hour ordeal that 
saw the plane be re-routed and flown across the Atlantic. The journey ended in Paris, where 
French authorities refused to negotiate. This paper examines this hijacking and the circumstances 
surrounding it. I place the hijacking within three broader contexts: international terrorism; 
Croatian nationalism; and the Croatian separatist movement, which emerged in the Croatian 
diaspora following World War Two. I argue that the hijacking of TWA 355 was an act by 
Zvonko Bušić meant to cement his legacy in the history of Croatian nationalism. Bušić made 
clear choices to use the spectacle of international hijacking to publicize the cause of Croatian 
independence in an attempt to gain international support and legitimacy for Croatian 
independence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 On September 10, 1976, TWA flight 355 was scheduled to travel from New York to 
Chicago. At 8:19 pm EST, those plans changed. Zvonko Bušić handed a flight attendant a note 
that was to be given to the captain. It read: 
 One, this airplane is hijacked. 
 Two, we are in possession of five gelignite bombs, four of which are set up in cast iron 
 pans giving them the same kind of force as a giant grenade. 
 Three, in addition, we have left the same type of bomb in a locker across from the 
 Commodore Hotel on 42nd Street. To find the locker take the subway entrance by the 
 Bowery Savings Bank. After passing through the token booth there are three windows 
 belonging to the bank. To the left of these windows are the lockers. The number of the 
 locker is 5713. 
 Four, further instructions are contained in a letter inside this locker. The bomb can only 
 be activated by pressing the switch to which it is attached but caution is suggested. 
 Five, the appropriate authorities should be notified from the plane immediately. 
 Six, the plane will ultimately be heading in the direction of London, England.1 
 
After receiving the note from Mr. Bušić, the captain made an announcement to the plane that 
they had been hijacked. There were 86 passengers and 7 crewmembers on board. The pilot, 
Captain Dick Carey, re-routed the plane towards Montreal. 
The hijackers were a motley group of four Croatian men and one young American 
woman. Their names were Zvonko Bušić, Julie Bušić, Frane Pešut, Slobodan Vlašić, and Petar 
Matanić. Zvonko Bušić undoubtedly was the leader. Bušić went to the lavatory and emerged 
wearing what appeared to be a dynamite vest. Bušić gave Frane Pešut a covered pot, which he 
was told was a bomb. Bušić instructed Pešut to sit in the back of the plane with the bomb.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1“592 F.2d 13: United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Zvonko Busic, Julienne Busic, Petar Matanic, Frane 
Pesut, defendents-appellants,” United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Argued December 8th, 1977, decided 
October 30th, 1987. Accessed January 27, 2014, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-
courts/F2/592/13/258617/#fnref1. 
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 Slobodan Vlašić wore a vest similar to Zvonko Bušić and patrolled near the front of the 
plane.  Petar Matanić was given a tear gas gun, and was told to patrol the aisles and be in charge 
of the lavatory. Julie Bušić, Zvonko’s wife, was responsible for passing out copies of their 
leaflets to the passengers and answering any questions that they had about the cause of Croatian 
independence.  At 9:01 P.M. EST, the plane landed to refuel in Montreal, before heading to 
Gander, Newfoundland, where a stop was needed prior to making the trip across the Atlantic.2   
Who were these hijackers? What did they want? Where did they come from? Why did 
they hijack an airplane? The hijacking of TWA 355 left many people asking all of these 
questions. Some of these questions were answered by the hijackers themselves in the two 
manifestos that were printed as part of their demands. This paper will answer these questions and 
place the hijacking in an historical context.  
I argue that the hijacking of TWA 355 was an act by Zvonko Bušić to cement his place in 
the history of Croatian nationalism. The hijacking of TWA 355 represented an individual action 
devised by Bušić, rather than a clearly defined act within the Croatian separatist movement that 
emerged after World War Two. The hijacking represented a unique case because of clear choices 
made by Bušić to differentiate the act from other actions of the Croatian separatist movement. 
Bušić attempted to differentiate the hijacking from the established Croatian separatist movement 
by distancing his action from specific strands of Croatian nationalism evoked by Ante Starčević 
and Ante Pavelić, which carried strong negative historical connotations. Instead, Bušić attempted 
to associate his version of Croatian nationalism with the legacies of less controversial strands of 
Croatian nationalism of Stjepan Radić and the Croatian Spring. He used the hijacking as a tool to 
publicize a specific Croatian nationalist message to a specific audience, the American public, in 
hopes of gaining support and legitimacy for the cause of Croatian independence. While the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2“Chronology of the Hijacking,” The New York Times, September 12, 1976. 
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hijacking in the narrowest sense was successful in placing the cause of Croatian independence on 
the front page of newspapers across the world, the geopolitics of the Cold War prevented any 
real change in policy by the United States towards Croatian independence.   
I will draw upon three distinct sets of literature to address the hijacking. First, I will 
establish the historical framework of international terrorism by drawing on the work of David C. 
Rapoport and his ‘wave theory’ of modern terrorism. To supplement his theory, I will draw on 
works by Bruce Hoffman and Brian Jenkins to show how Bušić attempted to use the spectacle of 
an international hijacking to publicize the cause of Croatian independence. Second, I will trace 
the historical roots of Croatian nationalism and Croatian separatism by examining the 
development of relevant strands of Croatian nationalist thinking. Third, I will explore the 
formation of the Croatian separatist movement following World War Two and the development 
of the movement's use of terrorism. 
I will analyze the hijacking from three perspectives: the background of the hijackers; the 
manifestos that the hijackers had printed; and the reaction to the event. An examination of the 
personal background of Zvonko Bušić will illuminte factors that drove him to the act of 
hijacking an airplane. An analysis of the manifesto will show a clear choice to distance the 
hijacking and Croatia's case for independence away from specific strands of Croatian 
nationalism that carried a strongly negative historical cononation. The reaction to the event will 
show that while the media was enamored with the spectacle of the hijacking, ultimately the tragic 
death of police officer Brian Murray as a result of the bomb placed in the locker, overshadowed 
any sympathetic feelings the hijackers attained through their action.   
 To analyze the hijacking, I will utilize a combination of primary and secondary sources 
on the event. Julie Bušić published a memoir in 2000 about the hijacking and her relationship 
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with Zvonko, entitled Lovers and Madmen: A True Story of Passion, Politics, and Air Piracy.3  
For newspaper sources, I rely upon articles published in three types of newspapers: large, 
national publications (New York Times, Washington Post, etc.); smaller publications from areas 
with large Croatian-American communities (Cleveland Press and Pittsburgh Post-Gazette); and 
Croatian-American newspapers published within the United States (Danica and Zajedničar). I 
also utilize archival documents from the FBI from the National Archives at College Park and the 
court transcript from the hijackers' appealate court trial. 
 The secondary literature on the hijacking is not extensive. J. Bower Bell devoted a 
chapter to the hijacking in his book, A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to 
Revolutionary Violence, but focused extensively on the state reaction to the event, rather than the 
origins of the hijackers.4 Paul Hockenos discussed the hijacking in his book, Homeland Calling: 
Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars, but focused on how the hijacking and the Croatian 
separatist movement affected the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s.5 Stephen Clissold and Mate 
Nikola Tokić have written about the Croatian separatist movement, but neither has analyzed the 
hijacking of TWA 355 extensively.6 My paper will build upon this existing literature by 
analyzing the hijacking of TWA 355 through a historical lense of terrorism and Croatian 
nationalism. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Julienne Eden Bušić, Lovers and Madmen: A True Story of Passion, Politics and Air Piracy (San Jose: Writers 
Club Press 2000). 
 
4J. Bowyer Bell, “The Case of the Croatians,” in A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to 
Revolutionary Violence (New York: Basic Books, Inc.) 6-35. 
 
5Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
2003). 
 
6See, Stephen Clissold, “Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence and Terrorism,” Conflict Studies, no. 103 
(1979); Nikola Mate Tokić, "Landscapes of Conflict: Unity and Disunity in Post-Second World War Croatian 
Émigré Separatism," European Review of History, 16, no. 5 (2009): 739-753, DOI:10.1080/13507480903262751; 
Nikola Mate Tokić, "The End of "Historical-Ideological Bedazzlement:” Cold War Politics and Émigré Croatian 
Separatist Violence, 1950-1980," Social Science History 36, no. 3 (2012): 421-445, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/social_science_history/v036/36.3.tokic.html. 
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TERRORISM FRAMEWORK 
 To better understand the hijacking of TWA 355 and how the hijacking was different to 
other actions by Croatian separatist groups, it is helpful to place the event into a context of 
international terrorism. To illuminate the differences, I will utilize three terrorism scholars’ 
works. David C. Rapoport developed a theory centered on waves of modern terrorism.7 
Rapoport’s theory identified two key waves: the ‘anticolonial’ wave, during which the Croatian 
separatist movement arose; and, the ‘New Left’ wave, during which the technology of hijackings 
emerged. By framing the hijacking of TWA 355 within Rapoport’s wave theory, the setting in 
which the goals and tactics of the Croatian separatist movement developed will become evident. 
In addition to Rapoport’s wave theory, two terrorism scholars have highlighted two other key 
features of terrorism during the time of the hijacking. Brian Jenkins’ famous ‘terrorism as 
theater’ argument will be highlighted as well as Bruce Hoffman’s work on the 
internationalization of terrorism.  
 By utilizing these three authors’ work, several important features of Croatian separatist 
terrorism and the hijacking of TWA 355 can be better explained. First, the origins of the Croatian 
separatist movement and the hijacking can be placed in Rapoport’s second wave of modern 
terrorism, with the goal of national self-determination being at the center of the terrorist actions. 
Second, both utilized the technology of Rapoport’s third wave, although the manner in which the 
hijackers of TWA 355 utilized the technology of the third wave differed from previous acts by 
Croatian separatist organizations. The hijackers of TWA 355 used the technology of hijacking in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand 
Strategy ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Georgetown University Press: Washington D.C., 2004). 
	   6	  
an attempt to gain legitimacy through appealing to the international community, which echoed 
the sentiments of groups acting during the ‘anticolonial’ wave. Appeals to the international 
community for legitimacy were absent by Croatian separatist organizations, whose actions 
mirrored the more violent tactics of third wave groups by targeting symbols of the Yugoslav 
state. These differences in tactics will be elucidated later in the paper in a discussion of the 
Croatian separatist movement and a thorough examination of the hijacking of TWA 355. In 
addition to shedding light on the origins and differences in tactics and goals of the Croatian 
separatist movement and the hijacking of TWA 355, the application of Rapoport’s theory to the 
case of Croatian separatist terrorism will shed light on the difficulties of establishing clearly 
defined waves of terrorism. Croatian separatist terrorism clearly transcends its original 
establishing wave and can be used as an example of a terrorist organization that Rapoport’s 
theory has trouble properly placing. 
 Rapoport developed a theory of modern terrorism that divided terrorist activities since the 
late nineteenth-century into four waves. It has come to be viewed as a seminal work in the 
historiography of terrorism.8 Rapoport’s theory has been argued to be “highly supportive through 
statistical analysis done with the most up-to-date data sets on terrorism.9   Rapoport described a 
wave as having three elements. First, he defined a wave as “a cycle of activity in a given period 
of time –a cycle characterized by expansion and contraction phases.”10 Second, each wave had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8See, Jean E.Rosenfield (ed.), Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy: The Four Waves theory and political violence. 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2011) and Jeffrey Kaplan, “Terrorism’s Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum 
and a Dilemma.” Perspectives on Terrorism, 2, no. 2:(2008) 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/26/html. 
 
9Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Looking for Waves,” in Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy: The Four 
Waves theory and political violence ed. Jean E. Rosenfeld (Routledge: New York, 2011), 13-29. 
 
10Rapoport, “Four Waves,” 47. 
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an “international character.”11 Finally, waves were “driven by a common predominant energy 
that shapes the participating groups’ characteristics and mutual relationships.”12 The four waves 
were the ‘anarchist wave’, the ‘anticolonial’ wave, the ‘New Left’ wave, and the ‘religious’ 
wave.  The names of the waves represented the wave’s “dominant energy but not its only 
feature.”13 Each of the first three waves lasted about forty years, suggesting a generational factor 
in the length of the waves.14 Waves are made up of different organizations, but the waves and 
organizations have “very different life rhythms,”15 with waves more often than not, outlasting 
terrorist organizations. The relevant waves to the hijacking of TWA 355 were the second, the 
‘anticolonial’ wave and the third wave, or the ‘New Left’ wave. 
 The most striking feature of the ‘anticolonial’ wave was the amount of success terrorist 
groups had at achieving their goals of national self-determination. The successes of second wave 
organizations came from three sources through which groups were able to grow their bases of 
support and legitimacy, both locally and internationally. First, organizations framed themselves 
and their struggles in new ways. Second, organizations utilized new tactics that were designed to 
broaden the appeal of their movement by provoking counter-atrocities by authorities. Third, the 
newly formed United Nations and its principle backer, the United States, both grew to support 
the dominant energy of anti-colonialism that drove this wave. The hijackers of TWA 355 
attempted to emulate the successes of the nationalistic terrorist organizations of the second wave, 
particularly by attempting to gain support from the United States and supranational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11Rapoport, “Four Waves,” 47. 
 
12Ibid. 
 
13Ibid. 
 
14Ibid., 48. 
 
15Ibid., 48. 
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organizations, as second wave organizations successfully did. 
The ‘anticolonial’ wave spanned from its precipitating event, the Versailles Peace 
Conference at the end of World War One till it began to die out in the mid-1960s. Although the 
wave began with Versailles, it was not until after World War Two that many of the campaigns 
began to gain a foothold. The energy that drove the wave was anticolonial, with the main target 
being European empires. This energy manifested itself in calls for national self-determination, 
attacks against colonialism and through a new framing of the terrorists’ causes. Organizations 
began to use new terminology to describe their campaigns. They labeled themselves as ‘freedom 
fighters,’ which were battling ‘government terror.’16 By emphasizing the anti-colonialism and 
calls for national self-determination and by framing their struggles in new ways, groups during 
the second wave were able to gain legitimacy and support for their causes. It was during this 
wave that the Croatian separatist movement emerged. 
The second wave also utilized innovative tactics that were designed to garner support 
locally and internationally. Due to an increase in diaspora support, bank robberies were no longer 
a necessary tactic to gain funds.17 Assassinations, which were the most prominent tactic of the 
first wave, were no longer common. The Balkans were an exception to this trend. The tactics that 
were most prevalent during the second wave were hit-and-run guerilla attacks, first aimed at 
police, who were the “government’s eyes and ears.”18 By targeting police, the insurgents were 
hoping to force the military to become involved in the campaign. The military was viewed as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16Rapoport, “Four Waves,” 54. 
 
17Ibid. 
 
18Ibid. 
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more prone to counter-atrocities, which spark an increase local and international support for the 
terrorist organization’s causes.19  
 Supranational organizations also emerged as a key actor during the second wave. The 
League of Nations drafted two conventions following the assassination of Alexander I of Serbia 
in 1934 in an attempt to address international terrorism. The League of Nations implemented 
neither action. Its successor, the UN, became a key source of legitimacy for nationalist and 
separatist movements.20 Almost all of the new states admitted to the UN were former colonies. 
These former colonies were much more likely to support the causes of nationalist and separatist 
movements at the supranational level. Due to the influx of former colonies in UN, many debates 
within the UN began to use the terminology of ‘freedom fighters’ when addressing anticolonial 
wave activities.21 It is also important to note that following the end of World War Two, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, both acted alongside the United Nations as key supporters of 
anti-colonialism. Following the second wave, legitimacy at the supranational level represented a 
key goal for groups seeking national self-determination. 
Rapoport named the third wave, the ‘New Left’ wave after the predominately left-leaning 
politics and goals of the active organizations during the wave. The wave began with the Viet 
Cong successes against the American military during the Vietnam War. When the Vietnam War 
ended, the Palestinian Liberation Organization replaced the Viet Cong as the “heroic model” of 
the wave.22 The term international terrorism began to be used again during the third wave as 
well.  The third wave began to fade away in the 1980’s as more and more of the national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19Rapoport, “Four Waves,” 54. 
 
20Ibid., 55. 
 
21Ibid., 56. 
 
22Ibid. 
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governments began to crack down on terrorist activity, as well as the UN shifting away from 
support of national liberation groups.  
The most important development during the third wave was the proliferation of airplane 
hijackings. While the first airplane hijacking occurred in 1931, the highest concentration of 
hijackings occurred over the period of 1968-1972, when an attempted hijacking occurred 
worldwide, once every 5.6 days.23 The key feature of the technology of hijacking was its ability 
to easily garner widespread media coverage. Hijacking was far from the only method used 
during the third wave. Kidnappings were prominently utilized to create hostage situations and 
extort demands. Targeted assassinations re-appeared as a terrorist repertoire after largely fading 
away during the second wave. Groups also chose targets with “international significance.”24 
These targets included embassies, national air carriers or international businesses.  
During the third wave, terrorists began to stage attacks outside their home country. These 
acts were often aimed at citizens of the outside country. These new tactical decisions differed 
from the national character of the second wave. Bruce Hoffman25, another scholar writing about 
the terrorism during the ‘New Left’ wave, stressed the internationalization of targets by terrorist 
groups and the goal of publicity during the third wave. He noted that terrorists began to expand 
their scope of action “to endow their acts with the power to attract attention and publicity that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23Robert T. Holden, "The Contagiousness Of Aircraft Hijacking." American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 4 (1986): 
874, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2779961. 
 
24Rapoport, “Four Waves,” 58. 
 
25Hoffman defines the “Internationalization of Terrorism” as beginning with the 1968 El Al flight by members of the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The similarities between Rapoport’s ‘New Left’ wave and Hoffman’s 
work make them easily comparable. See, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006), 67-68. 
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attacks against their declared or avowed enemies often lacked.”26 International publicity became 
a prominent goal of groups during the third wave. 
Brian Jenkins, writing in 1974, captured the perceived usefulness of international 
terrorism. He wrote, “Terrorism may be aimed at gaining publicity. Through terrorism, the 
terrorists hope to attract attention to their cause and project themselves, as a force that merits 
recognition and that must be reckoned with… Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at 
the actual victims. Terrorism is theater.”27 Hijackings represented the ultimate stage for 
broadcasting an organizations message to a worldwide audience. 
 This discussion of Rapoport’s wave theory is relevant to this paper because it establishes 
the setting in which the Croatian separatist movement emerged and the origins of the tactics 
utilized by both the hijackers of TWA 355 and other actors in the Croatian separatist movement. 
Rapoport’s second wave is defined by anticolonial sentiment and the goal of national liberation. 
Groups found success during this wave through the use of guerrilla techniques and through 
support from the international community for de-colonization. The hijackers of TWA 355 
attempted to achieve the same support from the international community, but utilized the 
innovative techniques of the third wave, namely hijacking, to achieve their goal.  
 I will use these three authors’ work to demonstrate the strategic choices that the hijackers 
of TWA 355 made that distinguish them from the other groups acting in the Croatian separatist 
movement. The hijackers of TWA 355 utilized third wave technology and strategies to attempt to 
foster support and gain legitimacy in an international setting. This strategy echoed those of 
groups in Rapoport’s second wave. Other actors in the Croatian separatist movement did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 68. 
 
27Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, Research Paper No. 48, California Seminar on 
Arms Control and Foreign Policy (Crescent Publications: Los Angeles, California, 1975), 4. 
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employ this strategy. They acted in manner similar to other active groups in the third wave of 
terrorism. An examination of history of the Croatian separatist movement, the hijacking of TWA 
355, the biographies of the main hijackers and the group’s two manifestos later in the paper will 
highlight these tactical choices and will illuminate the difficulties in establishing clearly defined 
waves of terrorism. Choices made in strategy, tactics, and goals were not the only avenue 
Zvonko Bušić and his co-conspirators chose to distinguish themselves from the broader Croatian 
separatist movement. A discussion of the historical background of Croatian nationalism and 
separatism will showcase other clear choices the hijackers made to distance themselves from 
more radical actors associated with Croatian nationalism and separatism. These choices included 
seeking to distance themselves from historical Croatian nationalist that carried a strong negative 
connotation and at the same time, invoking Croatian nationalists who do not carry such historical 
baggage. 
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BACKGROUND ON CROATIAN NATIONALISM 
 Through a discussion of key figures and events in the historical development of Croatian 
nationalism, a multi-layered picture develops. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, a strand 
of Croatian nationalism with a focus on Croatian national independence developed with 
politician Ante Starčević and his Party of Rights. Starčević’s historical legacy would later be 
invoked during the period of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, 
NDH) under the fascist leadership of Ante Pavelić and the Ustaša. Inbetween Starčević and 
Pavelić, Stjepan Radić rose to become the most important Croatian national politician of the first 
thirty years of the twentieth century. Radić, who was responsible for the first mass mobilization 
of the Croatian peasantry, advanced a different strand of Croatian nationalism to that of 
Starčević. Radić was so successful and popular among the Croatian peasantry that his legacy was 
none-the-less co-opted by both the NDH and their chief rival in Yugoslavia, the Partisans, during 
World War Two. Finally, the Croatian Spring in the late 1960s and the early 1970s represented 
the most salient representation of Croatian nationalism in Tito’s Yugoslavia. While noted for the 
diversity of views within it, the Croatian Spring was largely a nationalist movement with the goal 
of reforming Croatian rights within the framework of the federalist Yugoslavia.  
 These four historical cases were chosen because the major groups of the Croatian 
separatist movement defined their principles as being the legacy of Starčević, Radić, and Pavelić, 
while the hijackers of TWA 355 chose to place themselves inline with only Radić and the 
Croatian Spring. A discussion of these four iterations of Croatian nationalism is essential to this 
paper because the hijackers of TWA 355 made a clear choice to align themselves with the 
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legacies of Radić and the Croatian Spring and away from the negative historical conotations of 
Starčević, Pavelić, and the NDH.  
 The national question served as the most pressing political issue in Yugoslavia from its 
inception in 1918.28 Historian Ivo Banac defined the national question has having “to do with the 
conditions (by definition inadequate) for the free and independent development of nations and 
national communities – inadequate, because were it otherwise the question would not exist.”29 
The national question in Yugoslavia would be “the most serious political problem in the 
Yugoslav state.”30 This section will focus on calls for Croatian independence by highlighting 
prominent Croatian political elites.    
 In mid-nineteenth century, Ante Starčević developed and championed one of three 
strands of thinking about the Croatian question. The other two were: the Illyrian movement 
headed by Ljudevit Gaj initially and then taken up by Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, which 
stressed a “South Slav federalist approach;”31 and, the unitarist variant led by Svetozar 
Pribićević. Eugen Kvaternik and Ante Starčević developed the independent state variant, which 
will be discussed in this paper. Both the Illyrian movement and the unitarist variant would play 
major roles in the Yugoslav ideology of Tito, but the variant espoused by Starčević represented 
the key, pre-Yugoslavia ideology focusing on an independent Croatia.  
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Press,1984), 12. 
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 Starčević, along with Eugen Kvaternik and Ivan Matok founded the Party of Rights in 
1861.32 The Party of Rights had two main political tenets that drove its ideology. First, Starčević 
was driven by the desire “to accelerate the process of formation and integration of the Croatian 
nation.”33 For Starčević, the Croatian nation was “ define[d]… in ethnic terms, as a community, 
which shares the same myths, symbols, historic memories, culture, and above all, common 
national spirit.”34 Starčević and the Party of Rights virulently opposed the Hapsburg Empire and 
“demanded that the Hapsburgs recognize the right of Croatia to an independent existence- a 
separate existence which was to be determined by ‘God and the Croatians’ and not by Austria.”35 
His ideology had “a consistent and unselfish ideal of national liberation from the foreign 
Austrian and Magyar rule.”36 An independent Croatian state for the Croatian nation was at the 
center of Starčević’s ideology. 
 The second tenet of Starčević and the Party of Rights was “genuine patriotism of all 
Croatians,” 37 which manifested itself most visibly in a vehemently anti-Serb stance. He viewed 
homogeny as a necessary precondition for a nation. Starčević refused to acknowledge the 
existence of any other south Slav nation other than the Bulgarians.38 The land of Croatia included 
the lands Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. He viewed Serbs as Croats who had 
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33Gordana Uzelac, The Development of the Croatian Nation: an Historical and Sociological Analysis (Lewiston, 
N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), 102. 
 
34Uzelac, The Development, 113. 
 
35Govorchin, “Pravašto,” 59. 
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converted to Orthodox and that the word ‘Serbian’ itself, “was merely a geographic expression 
and…was derived from the term ‘servus’ or slave.”39 The dual tenets of a completely 
independent state for the Croatian nation and a virulent anti-Serb ideology would be incorporated 
into the ideology of future Croatian nationalists. Starčević emerged from the nineteenth-century 
as a leading figure of Croatian nationalism. Ante Pavelić invoked Starčević’s ideology so much 
so that one historian described Starčević as being “praised to the skies” during the NDH.40 
Starčević continued to be active in Croatian politics until his death in 1896. It was at the 
beginning of the twentieth century that a new Croatian politician emerged that introduced a 
different strand of thinking than Starčević.   
 In 1904, Stjepan Radić and his brother Antun founded the Croatian Popular Peasant Party 
(Hrvatski Pučka Seljačka Stranka, HPSS). Stjepan Radić was elected president of the party from 
its inception.41 Radić would become the most important Croatian politician of his time before 
being assassinated in the Yugoslav parliament in Belgrade in 1928. Radić’s political agenda 
consistently evolved throughout his political career as he acted “as a torchbearer of national 
consciousness”42 for the Croatian nation, but Croatian peasant rights remained at the center of his 
ideology. 
 When the HPSS formed in 1904, their stance on Croatian independence could not have 
been clearer. In a summary of the its general aims, the General Committee of the party stated, 
“Having assessed the Croatian past and present it became imperative that we should pursue a 
policy that will not only lead to a united Croatia and its complete independence, but will also 	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42Gaži, "Stjepan Radić,” 5. 
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provide for all people a better education and general social progress.”43 At the founding of the 
party, this call for Croatian independence was aimed at the ruling Hapsburg Monarchy. Even 
with the common goal of an independent Croatia, the Radić brothers eschewed the radical 
Croatian nationalism of Starčević. They criticized Starčević brand of nationalism as being too 
abstract and not inclusive enough to the peasantry.44  
 Radić led the HPSS from its inception in 1904 till his death in 1928. The HPSS was the 
first political party to successfully mobilized Croatian peasantry.  Over the course of his political 
career, the Radić’s politics morphed over time depending on the broader political situation at any 
given time. During the initial years of Radić’s political career, both before and during World 
War One, Radić strongly supported Croatian statehood through a reorganization of the Hapsburg 
Empire.45 His political career became more dynamic at the end of World War One when 
negotiations started regarding the unification of the south Slav lands. 
  Radić led the HPSS through three different phases of political strategy dating from the 
negotiations regarding unification until his assassination. The first phase of Radić’s political 
activity towards Yugoslavia occurred from 1918 to 1925. During this time, Radić lobbied 
heavily against the unification of Yugoslavia. He argued against the creation of a Serb-led 
centralized state and for the creation of a Croatian republic. He based this argument on the belief 
that during the four years of war in Croatia, the peasantry suffered the worst fate of all the 
population during the war. The peasantry “was not only a state serf (and really genuine state 
slave), but [a peasant] was worse than a beast of burden to the sundry official and unofficial 
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gentlemen.”46 He viewed the only way to ensure the positive future of the peasantry in Croatia 
was to be against the unification of Yugoslavia and for the creation of a Croatian peasant state. 
 As a delegate to the final Yugoslav negotiations in Belgrade, Radić made an impassioned 
speech at the conference’s conclusion. Radić described the unification as “the most terrible thing, 
the greatest sin and the gravest political mistake.”47 He ended his fiery speech with the lines, 
“Long live the republic. Long live Croatia.”48 With few allies in his fight, he left Belgrade un-
victorious and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was officially created on December 1, 
1918.  
 After the creation of the first Yugoslavia, Radić continued to oppose the policies and 
legitimacy of the new state. The name of the HPSS changed to the Croatian Republican Peasant 
Party (Hrvatska republicanska seljačka stranka, HRSS) “to emphasize its opposition to the 
Serbian dynasty,” and the party called for the creation of an independent Croatian republic.49 
Radić’s political power continued to grow during the early years of Yugoslavia, even with 
sporadic imprisonments for speaking out against the King, and the fact that Radić and the CRPP 
boycotted participating in the government of Yugoslavia.50 Radić’s stance towards the Yugoslav 
state began to shift after the Vidovdan Constitution was passed in 1921, but it was not until a trip 
abroad in 1924 to European capitals and the Soviet Union that he realized that his policies 
towards Yugoslavia must change. Radić found little support abroad for the creation of a Croatian 
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republic during his trip, and his immediate imprisonment upon return to Yugoslavia in 1924 
made him rethink his strategy.51  
 The second phase of Radić’s political strategy saw the HRSS completely change its 
orientation towards the Yugoslav state. From prison in 1925, Radić declared that the party should 
recognize the Yugoslav government as legitimate and fully participate in the political process. 
Radić saw participation as the only way forward to ensure greater peasant rights. The HRSS once 
again changed its name to reflect its shift in strategy. The new name for the party was the 
Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka, HSS). The HSS actively participated in the 
government for the first time. The HSS’s new platform included a shift in thinking about 
Croatian independence. The HSS advocated for increased Croatian autonomy driven by a change 
in the constitution of Yugoslavia.52 This new strategy by the HSS lasted two years; by 1927, the 
HSS was disappointed at the lack of progress and withdrew its support from the government.  
 The final stage began in 1927 and lasted until Radić was assassinated in the parliament of 
Yugoslavia in Belgrade in 1928. During these last two years, Radić re-joined the opposition and 
formed an opposition movement with Svetozar Pribićević and his Independent Democratic Party 
(IDP). Together the IDP and the HSS called for an end to “Serb hegemony”53 in Yugoslavia. 
Radić was assassinated on August 8, 1928. Political gridlock in Yugoslavia followed his death 
and King Alexander of Yugoslavia abolished the constitution, dissolved Parliament and declared 
a royal dictactorship.  
 The legacy of Stjepan Radić was mixed. Radić built a massive political base centered 
around Croatian peasants, but his political ideas surrounding Yugoslavia and Croatia consistently 	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morphed over time depending on the current political situation. The constant changing of Radić's 
political views and his immense popularity with Croatian peasantry after his death allowed his 
legacy to be claimed by multiple parties. During World War Two, both sides of the conflict in 
Yugoslavia laid claim to be the successors of Radić.54 When compared with the nationalistic 
politics of Ante Starčević though, Radić is remembered for his mobilization of Croatian 
peasantry, while Starčević is remembered for his vehement anti-Serb beliefs. Both Starčević and 
Radić would be utlized as political symbols during the time of the NDH.  
 The Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) was created on 
April 10, 1941 with backing from fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. It only lasted four years until 
Tito's Partisans officially defeated the NDH on May 8, 1945.  Ante Pavelić served as the 
supreme ruler of the NDH and the Ustaša55 party, which ruled the NDH. Pavelić and the Ustaše 
based their ideology on the concept of the nation. The nation was “defined as a community of 
blood and common spirit” and “required a state for its protection.”56 In this definition of the 
nation, the Pavelić developed two main political goals: the establishment of a Croatian state and 
“building a new social order.”57 Through treaties with Mussolini’s Italy (where Pavelić and the 
Ustaše were based after leaving Croatia following Stjepan Radić’s assassination in 1928) and 
Nazi Germany, Pavelić was able to gain control over a Croatian state, albeit with separate Italian 
and German zones of occupation.58 While the Ustaše were hopelessly reliant on German military 
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backing to prop up their regime, they none-the-less went about 'building a new social order' 
within the NDH. 
  The Ustaše utitilized historical and racial ideas in their conception of the Croatian nation. 
The creation of the Croatian nation-state was the “ultimate goal and value of the Croatian 
nation.” The Ustaše created the ‘cult of the state’ that called on Croatians to devote their whole 
life, even death, to the Croatian state, as it was the fulfillment of a centuries old Croatian national 
legacy.59 The Ustaše introduced racial conception into their Croatian national ideology. The 
racial dimension of the Ustaše ideology was based on the belief that Croatians were not a Slavic 
people, but actually were the descendants of Gothic peoples.60 The Ustaše “used ‘biology’ to 
justify” the wartime atrocities that occurred in the NDH during the war.61 The NDH was “the 
most brutal and most sanguinary satellite regime in the Axis sphere of influence during the 
Second World War,” with 623,000 total people dying in the territory during the war, and 80,000-
90,000 dying at the Jasenovac concentration camp alone.62  
 The NDH is important to this paper for two reasons. First, the NDH was the first iteration 
of an independent Croatia in the twentieth century. The NDH was undoubtedly a repressive, 
violent, Nazi-backed regime that committed horrible wartime atrocities during World War Two. 
The historical legacy of this initial iteration of an independent Croatia will forever carry strong 
negative historical connotations associated with the wartime atrocities of the NDH. Second, the 
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leaders of the NDH fled Croatia and sought refuge in friendly countries, notably Argentina, West 
Germany and Spain. It was from these countries that the former leaders of the NDH created the 
organizations that would form the postwar Croatian separatist movement. 
Before moving to the Croatian separatist movement that was located outside of Croatia, it 
is useful to note one other key political event occurred within Croatia. The Croatian Spring was a 
social movement that occurred in Croatia from 1966 to 1971. It represented the most active and 
influential Croatian nationalist movement within Yugoslavia after World War Two. It was noted 
for the diversity of views held by the multiple sets of actors that drove the movement, including 
three main groups: the Croatian Communist Party Leaders, Croatian intellectuals, and students. 
The three groups had varying views on the national question in Yugoslavia. 
Two Communist Party leaders rose to power in Croatia during the Croatian Spring. They 
were Miko Tripalo, a member of the Presidency of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia 
(LCY) Executive Bureau and Savka Dabčević-Kučar, the League of Croatian Communists 
(LCC) Secretary.63 The Party leaders sought to reform the standing of the republic of Croatia 
within Yugoslavia through the Party apparatus and were the most influential leaders of the 
Croatian Spring.  
 Their concerns centered on economics. Tripalo and Dabčević-Kučar focused 
predominately on the perceived-Federal/Serb domination of the Croatian economy. The 
perception in Croatia was that the government in Belgrade unfairly favored other republics over 
Croatia regarding foreign capital investments and Federal funding. Also, Tripalo and Dabčević-
Kučar sought to reform the method of "redistribution of former Federal assets and obligations," 
and sought "reform of the banking and foreign currency systems."64 	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 Another key economic issue to arise during this time period was the perceived 
domination of the Croatian economy by Serb companies. Belgrade-based foreign trade 
companies held an almost monopoly, at 77.1 percent, of Yugoslav income in foreign trade. In 
Croatia, Serbian banks from Belgrade had monopolized credit in the wealthy tourist area of the 
Dalmatian Coast.65 Tripalo and Dabčević-Kučar attempted to address these Croatian economic 
concerns by working through the Party apparatus of Yugoslavia, after gaining Tito’s support 
over Miloš Žanko, a more conservative member of the LCC, at the Tenth Party Plenum in 
January 1970.  
 The intellectuals of the Croatian Spring largely gathered around the cultural organization, 
Matica Hrvatska, and the University of Zagreb.66 Language issues were at the heart of the initial 
grievances of intellectuals, who published the Declaration Concerning the Name and Position of 
Croatian Standard Language in March 1967. One hundred and eighty scholars and cultural 
institutions in Croatia signed the Declaration. It called for the establishment of the equality in 
status and use of the Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian languages within Yugoslavia 
and for the consistent use of the Croatian language within Croatia. The Declaration was a sharp 
change in rhetoric towards language from agreements made in the 1950s. Previously, Party elites 
and intellectuals agreed that within Yugoslavia, Serbs and Croats spoke a common language 
entitled either Croato-Serbian or Serbo-Croatian, with two pronunciation variants - ljekavski in 
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Croatia and ekavski in Serbia- as well as two alphabets - Latin and Cyrillic- of equal status.67 The 
Declaration was a response by Croatian intellectuals to a perceived "Serbianization of the 
Croatian language."68 The issue of the 'Serbianization of the Croatian language' continued to be a 
cornerstone issue of the movement throughout. 
As the Croatian Spring continued, intellectuals broadened their issue base to include 
demographic issues, economic concerns similar to those brought up by the Party leaders and 
controversial subjects like World War Two deaths in Croatia and the status of Croatians in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The intellectuals focused their arguments around Croatian sovereignty, 
with sovereignty meaning “a Croat Communist leadership not susceptible to interfering central 
authorities.”69 The intellectual wing of the Croatian Spring offered a different avenue to express 
Croatian nationalist thought, which was outside of the Party apparatus. 
The final group was students. The student movement centered around the University of 
Zagreb. The students were the most idealistic of the three groups. They backed the Party 
leadership and “demanded full human and national rights for the Croatian people.”70 The 
idealistic students’ disappointment with lack of political reform led student groups to organize a 
strike in November 1971. It was this strike that triggered the crack down by Tito in December 
1971. Tito's crackdown was extensive. Tito forced the Party leaders to step down. In addition, at 
least "741 persons were stripped of their posts and expelled from the party, another 280 party 
members were merely compelled to resign their posts, and yet another 131 functionaries were 
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demoted."71 Many of the leaders of Matica Hrvatska, including future Croatian President Franjo 
Tuđman, were sentenced to long prison sentences during the crackdown. Matica Hrvatska and 
almost all of its publications were shut down. The purges also extended to "writers, filmmakers, 
university professors, and former liberal leaders" by its end in 1973.72 
The Croatian Spring, while a nationalist movement, never came to be a separatist 
movement. The three factions of the Croatian Spring were working to improve Croatian national 
rights and acted in different ways to achieve their goal. Tito described his need for action after 
the student strike as being because the Croatian Spring was moving “little by little towards a 
Separatist [sic] line.”73 The Croatian Spring was a showcase of Croatian nationalism within the 
Yugoslav Communist system. While some intellectuals voiced opinions on taboo subjects, the 
movement was not allowed to run its full course. Croatian separatism at this time continued to be 
confined to the diaspora-based groups set up by the former leaders of the NDH. 
 Many different politicians since the mid-nineteenth century espoused notions of Croatian 
nationalism and the ideal of a Croatian independent state. The hijackers of TWA 355 had clear 
choices in which historical figures to invoke in their manifestos. Starčević and Pavelić 
represented an approach to Croatian nationalism and statehood that would forever be associated 
with the atrocities of the NDH, while Radić and the Croatian Spring both represented a different 
strand, even with their complex ideologies and historical legacies. An analysis of the manifestos 
published during the hijacker later in this paper will illuminate the choices of the hijackers. 
Notably, the hijackers made no mention of Starčević, Pavelić or the NDH. In contrast to that 
omission, the hijackers specifically invoked the legacy of Radić and the leaders of the Croatian 	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Spring. The manifestos also presented arguments that echo both the economic and language 
grievances expressed during the Croatian Spring. The hijackers showed a clear choice in which 
historical legacy they hoped to be associated.  
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THE CROATIAN SEPARATIST MOVEMENT 
Following the flight of the leaders and sympathizers of the NDH in the aftermath of 
World War Two, a newly refashioned Croatian separatist movement formed within the Croatian 
diaspora outside of Yugoslavia. Multiple groups emerged, each started by a former leader of the 
NDH. A closer examination of the Croatian separatist movement that emerged following World 
War Two will illuminate two key characteristics of the movement. First, former Ustaša leaders 
began each of the three main umbrella groups following World War Two and guided the 
organizations to follow the ideology of the NDH. Second, a shift occurred within the Croatian 
separatist movement in the early 1960s and terrorist action became a prominent technique 
utilized by these separatist groups. These terrorist actions align with tactics described in 
Rapoport’s ‘New Left’ wave.  
 Three separate Croatian separatist organizations emerged out of Croatian diaspora 
following World War Two. Ante Pavelić formed a group based out of Argentina (Pavelić’s home 
after fleeing Croatia) called the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP-Hrvatski oslobodilački 
pokret). HOP aimed to be an "umbrella organization for all Ustaša organizations abroad… whose 
single aim was the liberation of Croatia from the clutches of 'Serbo-communism'" (Tokić 2009: 
741). HOP was the most well funded of the Croatian separatist groups in the immediate postwar 
period due to funds smuggled out of wartime Croatia and "could also count on at least the 
benevolence of some influential clerical circles" for support.74  
 In the Constitution of the Croatian Liberation Movement, the principles of HOP were	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 clearly presented. HOP’s principles were derived from the political work of Starčević and his 
Party of Right, the Radić brothers and their Croatian Peasant Party and Pavelić and the Ustaša 
Party.75 The Constitution also established three aims of HOP. First, HOP aimed to “refute the 
slanders spread against the Croatian people abroad and at propagating the truth concerning the 
Croatian State right.”76 Second, HOP aimed at “organizing and preparing the Croatian patriots 
and fighters for liberation of the Croatian people and for the re-establishment of the sovereign 
State of Croatia.”77 And third, to “take care of the interests of all Croatian minorities, which live 
out of the borders of the Croatian State, and observing all their justified aspirations.”78 While 
terrorism against Yugoslavia was not mentioned in this constitution written in 1956, following 
the radicalization of a new generation of Croatians abroad, HOP and other groups turned to 
terrorism to further their cause. 
 The second major group to emerge was the Croatian National Committee (HNO - 
Hrvatski narodni odbor). Croatian Nationalist leader Branko Jelić formed the HNO in 1950 in 
Munich. Jelić was an original member of the Ustaša and the group's prewar representative to 
Nazi Germany.79 The HNO, like the HOP, was "meant to serve as an umbrella organization for 
all Croats who sought the re-establishment of an Independent Croatian State.”80 While the HNO 
goal of the re-establishment of an independent Croatia matched that of other separatist groups, 
the HNO was none-the-less criticized for being too moderate. The HNO attracted supporters who 	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aimed to re-establish an independent Croatian state "based on the principles of democracy, 
human rights, and rule of law."81 Jelić was also the only separatist leader to advocate for any 
relationship with Stalin's Soviet Union, another difference from other Croatian separatist 
groups.82 
 The third radical Croatian separatist group to emerge in the postwar period was the 
Croatian National Resistance (Otpor - Hrvatski narodni otpor). Vjekoslav 'Maks' Luburić 
founded Otpor in his postwar home of Franco's Spain in 1955. During World War Two, Luburić 
was in charge of the notorious concentration camp in Croatia, Jasenovac. Otpor was the most 
militant of the Croatian separatist groups formed in the postwar period. From its onset, Luburić 
vowed the organization would: 
  "Declare loud and clear: we are AGAINST EVERY YUGOSLAVIA …it is   
 essential to BREAK COMPLETELY FROM YUGOSLAVIA AS     
 INDEPENDENT CROATIAN STATE the whole of Croatian territory, in its   
 historical and ethnic boarders without concern where the other nations [of    
 Yugoslavia] choose to do the same or not.83  
 
 It was Otpor that Bušić was associated with during his time in the United States.84 Bušić and the 
hijacking's connection to the Croatian separatist movement will be explored later in this paper.  
 Otpor was the most radical of the umbrella organizations that emerged after World War 
Two. At the top of every issue of Otpor's newsletter, they stated their radical agenda: 
 Our position is clear. Annihilate every Yugoslavia! To annihilate it with the   
 Russians and the Americans, with the communists, non-communists, and anti-  
 communists; to annihilate it with all those who annihilate it. To annihilate it with   	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 the dialectic of words and with dynamite, but to annihilate it absolutely; for, if   
 there is any state which has no entitlement to existence, it is exclusively and alone  
 Yugoslavia!85  
While Otpor was considered the most radical of the separatist factions, all three groups based 
their ideology on the ideology of the Ustaša regime.  
 Up to the early 1960's, the Croatian separatist movement did not prominently utilize 
terrorism to achieve their goals. The Croatian separatist movement's goal was to amass recruits 
and prepare for the clash between East and West, which they believed to be eminent. The 
group’s goals were "to position themselves as critical allies of the West in the struggle against 
global communism" and for this support, they believed, they would be rewarded with their own 
independent Croatian state.86 Beginning in the early 1960s, the movement's tactics began to shift 
towards terrorism when a new generation of Croatians arose within the émigré communities. 
 The organizations recruited their membership predominately from new Croatian migrants 
to Western Europe after World War Two. West Germany served as the ripest ground for finding 
new recruits in the 1960s because of an influx of guest workers from Yugoslavia, which 
accompanied the West German economic boom. From 1960 to 1976, the number of Yugoslav 
workers in West Germany rose from 22,000 to 640,000. These guest workers were 65 percent 
Croatian. The new Croatian migrants became the backbone of the Croatian separatist movement 
because they were "young, poor, uneducated and disaffected."87 These new, young émigrés were 
inundated with radical propaganda to convert them to the Croatian separatist cause. One typical 
example of this propaganda read: 	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 It must be clear to all, that this state [an independent Croatia] can only be    
 established through a general Croatian revolution, and not through peaceful, legal,  
 or diplomatic means. We know well the character and qualities of our adversary.   
 They will never leave on their own, as long as they have the power and bayonets in their  
 hands. One must take them away, so that the Croatian nation once again can have   
 a state of its own accord and become master of its own destiny.88  
The young and malleable Croatian émigrés would become one of the most active terrorist 
movements of the era.89 
 HOP, HNO, Otpor and other radical Croatian separatist groups were very active from the 
mid-1950 onward in Australia, Sweden and the US, in addition to the states where the HOP, 
HNO and Otpor were founded.90 Over a ten-year period in Australia, various separatist groups 
"committed no fewer that 52 significant incidents of violence…leading to a high number of 
casualties and considerable property damage."  Worldwide, they carried out "more than 50 
assassinations or assassination attempts, 40 bombings of public buildings and monuments, and 2 
airplane hijackings."91 The terrorist acts carried out by Croatian separatists followed closely in 
line with the symbolic target choices of Rapoport’s third wave. 
 The groups specifically sought to target symbols of the Yugoslav state. An instruction 
manual created by an Australian-based group urged supporters to “Destroy all Yugoslav 
embassies and consulates, kill Yugoslav diplomatic representatives because they are common 
criminals and Fascists. Prevent migrants from travelling on Yugoslav aircraft, and destroy 
Yugoslav aircraft. Wreck the travel agencies.”92 An Otpor leader also explicitly expressed a 
desire to target Yugoslav symbols by writing, “Yugoslavia does not exist only within its borders, 	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but also abroad…We must annihilate Yugoslavia everywhere it exists.”93 An example of this 
strategy in action was the other hijacking committed by Croatian separatists in the 1970s.   
 The first hijacking by Croatian separatist occurred in Sweden in 1972 when members of 
the terrorist organization Otpor hijacked SAS 130. Two precipitating events from the previous 
year led to the hijacking. First, on February 10, 1971, two Croatians seized the Yugoslav 
consulate in Gothenburg, Sweden. The gunmen vowed to killed the five hostages they seized, 
unless the Yugoslav authorities released a Croatian terrorist who was on death row in Croatia, 
and sent the released prisoner to Spain with $100,000.94 The gunmen held the Consulate for 
twenty-four hours before unceremoniously surrendering on February 11, 1971.95  
 The second event also involved Yugoslav officials in Sweden.  On April 7, 1971, two 
Croatian gunmen entered the Yugoslav embassy and shot and killed Vladimir Rolović, the 
Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden. The gunmen also injured two other embassy employees.96 
After shooting the ambassador, the two gunmen surrendered to authorities. Three others were 
also arrested in connection with the planning of the assassination. A total of seven Croatians 
were in jail from these two acts. The hijacking of SAS 130 was a direct response to these two 
previous events. 
 On September 15, 1972, three Croatian men boarded SAS 130 in Gothenburg, Sweden. 
Shortly after departure, the three men hijacked the airplane with guns smuggled onto the plane. 
They demanded that the plane immediately redirect to Malmö, Sweden.97 The plane proceeded to 
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Malmö with ninety total passengers, including the hijackers and crew.98 The seven Croatians 
imprisoned for the seizure of the consulate in Gothenburg and the assassination in Stockholm 
were to be immediately released from prison and were to meet the hijacked airplane in Malmö. 
 In Malmö, the negotiations between the hijackers and the police continued. The hijackers 
and the police agreed that half of the released prisoners would board the plane, and then 
immediately half of the hostages would be released. This exchange would be repeated twice. The 
first exchange went according to plan, with half of the hostages released after three of the 
released prisoners boarded. After the next three released prisoners boarded the plane, the 
hijackers changed their demands. The hijackers refused to release the hostages as agreed upon 
earlier. They demanded that the plane be re-fueled and that they wanted one million Swedish 
crowns. Eventually, the hostages were released in exchanged for the plane being re-fueled and 
negotiated sum of five hundred thousand-crowns, but the airline crew remained onboard the 
hijacked aircraft.99  
 The hijackers then proceeded to force the pilots to fly to Spain. Once landed in Spain, 
Spanish authorities immediately surrounded the plane. The crew was released and the hijackers 
surrendered.100 The Spanish authorities confiscated the five hundred thousand-crown ransom and 
held a trial for the hijackers, but after a year in prison, the hijackers were released. Some of the 
hijackers left for Paraguay after being released, where they mistakenly killed the Uruguayan 
ambassador to Paraguay, when they meant to kill the Yugoslav ambassador.101 After this event, 
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these men were handed over to the Swedish authorities.102  
 Through the examination of the origins of the Croatian separatist movement and its shift 
to terrorist activity in the early 1960s a number of characteristics of the movement come to light. 
The Croatian separatist movement original leaders and ideology directly descended from the 
regime of the NDH. All three main umbrella organizations were led by former Ustaše leaders 
and espoused its ideology. Second, when the movement shifted towards terrorist activities in the 
early 1960s, the organizations acted like classic wave three actors. They specifically targeted 
symbols of the Yugoslav state outside of the Yugoslavia through bombings and targeted 
assassinations. The hijacking of SAS 130 showed Croatian separatists utilizing hijacking to 
secure demands and safe-passage that they believed would further the cause of Croatian 
independence. While Zvonko Bušić and the other hijackers of TWA 355 shared the same long-
term goal, an independent Croatia, as these other Croatian separatist actors, a close examination 
of the hijacking of TWA 355 will shed light on the differences between the hijacking of TWA 
355 and other Croatian separatist movement actions.  
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THE HIJACKING 
 TWA flight 355 was originally scheduled to fly from New York to Chicago. Shortly after 
takeoff, the flight was hijacked and sent by the hijackers in the direction of London, England. In 
the meantime, at 11 P.M., EST the NYPD found the locker mentioned in the original hijacking 
note. Inside the locker were an envelope with copies of two leaflets and another set of demands 
and “a cast iron stew pot with two wires running out from under the pot’s lid and taped to the 
outside.”103 The demands read: 
 Here are the demands which must be immediately met, one, both of these texts must 
 appear in their entirety in tomorrow morning's edition of the following newspapers: New 
 York Times, all three editions; Los Angeles Times; Chicago Tribune; International 
 Herald Tribune; and Washington Post. 
 Two, at least one third of each text must be printed on the first page of the first section. 
 The remainder in the first section. 
 Three, through a prearranged code word we shall hear if these demands have been met by 
 tomorrow (sic) deadline. If they have not been met, a second timed explosive device 
 which is likewise in a highly busy location shall be activated. In the event these texts are 
 printed as per instructions, this device will be deactivated. 
 Four, the fate of many people hangs in the balance if any attempts whatsoever are made 
 to circumvent our instructions. Fighters for Free Croatia.104  
 
The NYPD removed the bomb from the locker and took it to a deactivation site in the Bronx. At 
12:45 A.M. EST, the bomb exploded at the site in the Bronx. The blast killed police officer Brian 
Murray and seriously injured three other police officers.   
The plane landed in Newfoundland at 1 A.M. Captain Carey informed Mr. Bušić that the 
current plane they were flying, a Boeing 727, was not equipped with the proper navigational 
equipment, and the crew were not rated properly to safely make a transatlantic flight. They	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 would have to wait for another plane, a Boeing 707, to guide them across the Atlantic. In 
order to secure the guide plane, and a helicopter to distribute leaflets over Montreal, the hijackers 
agreed to release 35 passengers.105 After releasing the passengers and waiting several hours for 
the 707 to be arranged, TWA 355 took off for Keflavik Air Base in Iceland. 
 At 6:57 A.M. EST, the 727 landed in Iceland. In Iceland, the plane was refueled again, 
and luggage, containing copies of the group’s leaflets, was transferred to the 707. The leaflets 
needed to be transferred because Mr. Bušić wanted the leaflets to be dropped above London, 
their next destination, and a Boeing 707 is better equipped to perform this task than a 727.106  
The two planes eventually took off for London. The 727 performed holding patterns over 
London, while the 707 dropped the leaflets above the city. Over the next 24 hours, propaganda 
letters were also dropped above Montreal, Chicago and New York in fulfillment of the hijacker’s 
request.107 After successfully dropping the leaflets over London, both planes flew towards 
Charles de Gaulle Airport, where before landing, more leaflets were dropped over the city center 
of Paris. 
The French authorities decided to take a hardline approach to the situation. Initially, they 
were not going to let the 727 land in Paris, but were eventually persuaded by the United States 
Federal Aviation Administration to allow the plane to land. Immediately the French authorities 
directed the plane to a remote area of the airport. It was around 1 P.M. EST. Several hours later, 
the French shot out the planes tires and blocked the runway. The French Interior Minister Michel 
Poniatowski then radioed out to the 727 and explained the French hardline position on the 
hijacking. He said, 	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Your plane cannot take off. You are considered personally responsible for the lives of the 
passengers and the crew. You have therefore the choice of two solutions: To be executed 
if you threaten the lives of the hostages or to surrender to French authorities in order to be 
immediately deported. These conditions are irrevocable.108  
 
This ultimatum by the French would bring an end to the journey. 
 At 9 P.M. EST, the hijackers spoke over the radio with American Ambassador Kenneth 
Rush. It was agreed that Julie Bušić would leave the plane and go to the control tower to receive 
confirmation that the manifestos had been published. She did this, and immediately after 
verifying the publications was arrested.109  
 At 2 A.M. EST, the ordeal finally ended. The remaining four hijackers surrendered to the 
authorities. Zvonko Bušić revealed to the passengers, crew and possibly the other two hijackers 
that the bombs had been fake. They were made of nothing but pots, silly putty and wires. The 
hijackers broke the ‘bombs’ into smaller pieces and distributed them to the remaining 
passengers.110 While Bušić had hoped to fly the plane to Zagreb and distribute leaflets over the 
city, he still considered the event a success with mass publication of the cause of Croatian 
independence. The five hijackers were given a choice by the French to be deported to Yugoslavia 
or to the United States. They chose the United States, where they were charged with air piracy. 
The remaining passengers on the plane were flown to Chicago after the ordeal.  
BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 While the whole ordeal took place over thirty hours, many were left wondering who were 
the hijackers and where did they come from? This section will analyze these questions. Zvonko 
Bušić identified himself as the leader of the group and mastermind of the hijacking. He was 
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subsequently interviewed about the hijacking. His wife Julie’s role, which in the immediate 
aftermath of the event was unclear, can now be more firmly established with the publishing of 
her memoir. Julie’s role was peripheral, although it will be seen that she played a part in 
researching planes and hijackings. The other three hijackers - Mark Vlašić, Petar Matanić and 
Frane Pešut – played minimal roles in planning the hijacking. Vlašić, Matanić, and Pešut were 
allegedly only told they were going on a “mission for Croatia” on the day of the hijacking.111  
 Zvonko Bušić was clearly the main protagonist of the hijacking of TWA 355. The U.S. 
justice system corroborated this statement. Zvonko Bušić spent 32 years in prison for the 
hijacking, while the other four participants spent between twelve and thirteen years in jail. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to offer a comprehensive psychological profile of Zvonko and 
Julie Bušić. In lieu of a comprehensive profile, I will establish some relevant background 
information on the Bušićs that will provide the personal context out of which they hijacked TWA 
355. I argue that Zvonko Bušić felt a deep connection to the cause of Croatian nationalism and 
independence and deeply desired to become a Croatian intellectual. Due to growing fear of 
assassination by Yugoslav intelligence services and his desire to become a major player in the 
Croatian separatist movement, Bušić ultimately turned to the act of hijacking an airplane to 
attempt to make an impact for his cause of Croatian independence. To analyze Bušić’s 
background, I will utilize the work of Jeanne Knutson. Knutson interviewed Zvonko Bušić 
extensively for her chapter (1981) entitled “Social and Psychodynamic Pressures Towards a 
Negative Identity: The Case of an American Revolutionary” in Behavioral and Quantitative 
Perspectives on Terrorism, ed. Yonah Alexander.112 I also utilize Julie Bušić’s memoir, which 
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was published in 2000.  
 Zvonko Bušić was born on January 23, 1946 in Gorica, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
Yugoslavia. He described the village he grew up in as “alive with stories of Croatian history and 
of Croatian Patriots.”113 While he does believe that both his parents and his siblings shared a 
strong sense of Croatian nationalism with him, there were two other important figures that Mr. 
Bušić identified as being very influential in his life and specifically, influenced his Croatian 
Nationalism. 
 The first figure was Stjepan Radić. As discussed earlier in this paper, Radić was the 
leading Croatian natoinalist in the first quarter of the twentieth century, noted for his ability to 
mobilize Croatian peasantry. The second influential figure was Zvonko’s cousin, Bruno Bušić. 
Bruno Bušić was a Croatian intellectual and journalist. He was allegedly assassinated in Paris in 
1978 by the Yugoslav intelligence service, UDBA.114 Zvonko described Bruno Bušić “as some 
kind of ideal of Croatian nationalism and patriotism.”115 Idolizing Stjepan Radić and Bruno 
Bušić from an early age, Zvonko Bušić became enthralled with Croatian nationalism before he 
left his hometown to study in Zagreb.   
 Bušić left his hometown with the goal of becoming a Croatian nationalist intellectual, in 
the same mold as Bruno Bušić. He began his studies in Zagreb in the early 1960s, but felt 
compelled to leave Yugoslavia and seek education abroad due to fear for his safety after openly 
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supporting Croatian nationalist causes in Yugoslavia. He had seen friends of his be taken away to 
jail and “was tipped off that his turn was approaching.”116 He left for Vienna and began a 
nomadic existence driven by fear and terror that would define his life from that point forward.  
 The next few years of Bušić’s life, he was constantly living in a state of flux with Bušić 
shuttling between Western Europe and the United States. Initially, he attempted to finish his 
studies in Vienna, only to have his visa revoked after he was forced to drop out of university due 
to financial concerns. Bušić never completed his university studies. It also was during this time 
that he met his future wife, Julie Schultz, who was an American tutoring English in Vienna.117 
With Zvonko unable to return to Yugoslavia out of fear of repercussions by the Yugoslav 
authorities, he convinced Julie and a friend of hers to travel to Zagreb in 1970 and drop leaflets 
from a prominent tower in Zagreb. Julie was arrested for this act and spent one month in prison 
in Yugoslavia.118     
 Also during this period, Bušić became associated with Croatian separatist groups both in 
the United States and Europe. Zvonko lived in Cleveland for a period in the late 1960s, where he 
joined the Cleveland wing of the Croatian separatist group, Otpor. A member of the Croatian 
community of Cleveland described him as being an “active” member of Otpor while in 
Cleveland.119 Zvonko tried to organize the younger members of Otpor into a “more active 
faction,”120 but he failed to accomplish this because the older members refused support him. 
While living in West Germany, Bušić met with Branko Jelić, who was the head of the Croatian 
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separatist group, Croatian National Resistance (HNO - Hrvatski narodni odbor). Bušić and Jelić 
did not work together long before having a falling out because they did not “see eye-to-eye 
anymore.”121 In Julie Bušić’s memoir, she described a trip that she and Zvonko took to Ireland to 
meet with members of the Irish Republican Army to establish connections between the Irish 
group and Croatian groups in Western Europe. The trip was ultimately unsuccessful with the 
Bušićs forced to leave Ireland without holding any significant meetings.122   
 By 1972, Zvonko and Julie were married and living in Oregon, while Julie returned to 
school. In September 1972, Zvonko read about the hijacking of SAS 130. He asked Julie to learn 
everything she could about airplanes and hijackings, including if it was possible to drop leaflets 
from a plane.123 Julie Bušić set out to learn everything there was to know “about commercial 
planes, the 727s, the 747s, the DC-10s.”124 This was the beginning of the planning for the 
hijacking of TWA 355.  
 In 1975, the couple moved to New York City. Zvonko continued to fear for his physical 
safety.125 As Julie Bušić put it, it was also during this time that “the subject of hijacking [had] 
moved from simple hypothesis to a shady area that defies analysis.” Zvonko had made a decision 
to hijack an airplane for the cause of Croatian independence.126 Julie Bušić attempted to reason 
with Zvonko that a hijacking would bring negative media attention and that she feared the 
repercussions of such a radical action. But Zvonko was adamant that a hijacking was the right 
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action. He later described a purpose of the hijacking as “to brighten up those ideas, to… keep 
hopes alive, to calm down people and… make them aware, most.”127 While Julie allegedly 
attempted to convince Zvonko not to hijack the airplane, she ultimately decided to go along with 
her husband. 
 With the idea of hijacking an airplane firmly affixed in Bušić, Zvonko recruited the three 
other Croatians to carry out the hijacking with him and his wife. Bušić described the criteria for 
picking the other three hijackers as being centered on “the certainty that no Yugoslav infiltrators 
were involved, that all were good Croatian patriots, that those chosen trusted him and would be 
willing to following [sic] his lead without advanced questioning.”128 The other three men 
allegedly did not know that they were going to be involved in a hijacking.129 With a loyal crew 
assembled, Zvonko Bušić was now positioned to execute the act that he hoped would “confirm 
his identification with the Croatian people and the Croatian cause, to finalize his revolutionary 
identity.”130 In the eyes of Bušić, the hijacking of TWA 355 would cement his legacy. 
 The final question to ask is how should this event be interpreted within the Croatian 
separatist movement? As previously discussed, Bušić had been associated with Croatian 
separatist organizations, but characteristics of the hijacking hardly point to this event being the 
work of an established terrorist actor. After the event, Bušić denied that the hijacking was 
connected to any Croatian separatist organization.131 Hockenos, in his book Homeland Calling: 
Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars, contradicted this denial. Hockenos claimed “Bušić was a 	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prominent Otpor loyalist and leader of the North American branch in the early 1970s.”132 
Hockenos added that the former leader of North American Otpor, Marin Sopta, said of the 
Bušićes, “The Bušićes were our heroes. They did more to promote the Croatian cause than 
anyone else.”133 Hockenos also noted that Sopta visited Bušić often during his prison sentence. 
  Even with these connections to Otpor, characteristics of the hijacking point to the event 
being the work of an amateur, not the work of an established terrorist organization. During the 
trial, Bušić testified that he bought the dynamite for the real bomb from a man in a bar. Bušić 
claimed the man asked him, “You like a revolutionary. Are you?” To which Bušić replied, “Yes. 
And you look like the Mafia. You must sell illegal stuff.” Bušić then proceeded to buy dynamite 
from the man out of the truck of the man’s car.134 Other logistical factors also point to the 
hijacking being an amateur undertaking, such as the lack of real knowledge about the plane’s 
trans-Atlantic flight capability and the plane’s ability to actually drop leaflets over cities. 
 A brief examination of the background of Zvonko Bušić illuminates three key points that 
are relevant to the hijacking. First, Bušić sought to connect himself with other prominent 
Croatian nationalists, both in an historical sense, through Stjepan Radić, and a contemporary 
setting, through Bruno Bušić. Second the growing fear of physical violence, which allegedly had 
followed Bušić since his time in Yugoslavia, ultimately pushed Bušić to hijack TWA 355. Third, 
Zvonko Bušić had been associated with Croatian separatist groups in both the United States and 
Western Europe. Prior to the hijacking, Bušić failed the make his mark in the Croatian separatist 
cause. The hijacking would cement his legacy in the movement, but the amateur characteristics 
of the hijacking hardly lead one to believe that the hijacking was the work of an established 	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terrorist organization. The hijacking of TWA 355 was a desperate act, carried out by a desperate 
man, but what message did Bušić publicize to the world through this act? 
ANALYSIS OF MANIFESTOS 
 Zvonko Bušić and his co-conspirators’ main demand after hijacking TWA 355 was for 
the group’s two manifestos to be published in five major newspapers: the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times and the International Herald 
Tribune. The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, and the LA Times all 
published at least excerpts from the texts at the urging of the FBI.135 In addition to the publishing 
of the texts in the newspapers, the hijackers demanded that copies of the leaflets be dropped over 
Chicago, Montreal, London and Paris. These two texts were at the center of the event. What can 
we learn by their contents?  
 The centrality of the leaflets to the hijackers sheds light on two key aspects of the 
hijacking. The centrality of the leaflets in the hijackers’ demands showed that publicity was the 
primary goal of the hijackers. Unlike the hijackers of SAS 130 who demanded both cash and safe 
transportation, Zvonko Bušić was only concerned about the publication of the manifestos. In one 
of texts of the hijackers of TWA 355, the stated goal of the hijacking “was to present an accurate 
picture of the brutal oppression taking place in Yugoslavia,” and “to illustrate the idea that there 
indeed exists, nobler values than the preservation of a bloody, totalitarianistic, and imperialistic 
creation.”136 The manifestos would present this ‘accurate picture.’ The hijackers were dependent 
on the spectacle of an international hijacking catching the attention of the media.  
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 If publicity for the Croatian grievances against Yugoslavia was the sole goal of the 
hijacking, how was the hijacker’s choice of audience important? The hijackers stated that they 
chose to target an American audience because “[w]hen the eventual uprising against Serbian 
Imperialism begins, the American people will not, then, allow themselves to be further 
manipulated regarding the justifications of such an occurrence.”137 The American audience was 
key to the hijackers goals because they wanted to present their case for Croatian independence.  
 Through the text of their manifestos, the hijackers made clear choices in where they 
placed themselves in the historic legacy of Croatian nationalism. Stjepan Radić was mentioned 
by name, but more importantly, there was no mention of Ante Starčević, Ante Pavelić, or the 
NDH. The hijackers also sought to identify with the Croatian Spring, as opposed to Starčević or 
Pavelić by citing similar grievances to those that arose during the Croatian Spring. Their 
attempts to distance themselves from the negative legacy of Pavelić and the NDH and to present 
parallel arguements to those made in the Croatian Spring become evident when analyzing the 
hijackers’ manifestos.  
The hijackers invoked two themes that can be drawn directly back to the Croatian Spring. 
First, economic grievances played a prominent role in the hijacker’s text. They claimed, “The 
Croatian moral and material possessions are disposed of in any way Belgrade deems appropriate. 
Through taxes and all resources from the land.”138 The specific economic issue that the hijackers 
noted in the text was the percentage of national income being set apart “for use in under-
developed countries.” The hijackers claimed that 8 percent of Croatian national income was 
being repurposed to projects outside of Croatia by the Belgrade regime, when the United Nations 
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only suggested the percentage for any nation to be 0.5 percent.139 These economic grievances 
directly echo similar arguments that were prominently featured during the Croatian Spring. 
Second, language issues played a prominent role in the texts. The texts claimed, “A 
frantic attack, unparalleled anytime or anyplace, is being waged against the Croatian 
language.”140 While other dialects in Yugoslavia were currently being developed into modern 
languages, the hijackers claimed, “The Croatian grammar and orthography…is prohibited and 
burned.”141 Once again, these arguments paralleled others made by Croatian intellectuals during 
the Croatian Spring. The manifesto also made references to Tito’s purge of the liberal Party 
leadership during the Croatian Spring. The text referred to forced resignation of the Party leaders 
during the Croatian Spring, Miko Tripalo and Dr. Savka Dapcević-Kučar, as a prominent 
example of Croatian political oppression.142 The only other historic Croatian figure referenced 
specifically by name in the manifestos was Stjepan Radić.143 As discussed earlier, many 
politicians cited Radić’s legacy on opposite sides of the spectrum during the Yugoslav period. 
The absence of any mention of the NDH, Pavelić or Starčević clearly showed a desire to distance 
the group from these negative connoting strands of Croatian nationalism. 
By analyzing the two texts that the hijackers distributed, clear choices by the hijackers 
become evident. First, the hijackers chose to hijack an American airplane and demanded that 
their two texts be printed in four American newspapers, one international newspaper and be 
dropped above major Western capitals. These demands point to the desire to utilize the ‘theatre’ 
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of terrorism to publicize their cause, and gain legitimacy in the international sphere. Second, the 
hijackers aimed to place themselves away from the strongly negatively connoting strands of 
Croatian nationalism, instead attempting to associate with the more moderate ideas of Stjepan 
Radić and the Croatian Spring. These two choices by hijackers of TWA 355 differentiate their 
actions from those of other actors in the Croatian separatist movement. 
REACTION 
 The reaction to the hijacking took a number of different forms. Croatian-American 
newspapers and the Yugoslav state media clearly chose sides in their reporting of the event. The 
mainstream American media took a more nuanced approach by providing historical context to 
Croatian nationalism. The mainstream media also expressed sympathetic views towards the 
hijackers, which were evident in portrayals of the hijackers through interviews with passengers 
on TWA 355 and friends and family of the hijackers. Ultimately though, the death of police 
officer Brian Murray and the hijackers’ conviction in court overshadowed any sympathetic views 
for the hijackers. 
 Hrvatski Tjednik Danica –The Morning Star (Danica) was a Croatian language weekly 
newspaper published by the Croatian Franciscans of St. Jerome Croatian Catholic Church in 
Chicago from 1946 to 1990. The Croatian Franciscans clearly defined the paper’s political 
message on the Church’s website by stating that one of the paper’s goals was to “convey a 
specific answer to a number of pro-Yugoslav papers which were circulated throughout the 
United States and had a negative influence on the Croatian immigrants.”144 The newspaper also 
strongly favored Croatian independence. Following the collapse of the NDH and the re-creation 
of Yugoslavia, the Croatian Franciscans aimed to use the paper as a way “to circulate the truth 	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about Croatians, and broaden the national thoughts and ideas of an independent home.”145 
Danica covered the hijacking and trial extensively. The paper supported the hijackers 
throughout. 
 The initial coverage in the edition following the hijacking included a lengthy summary of 
the event. At the end of initial coverage, they specifically compiled the positive reactions to the 
hijackers and their cause from the passengers on TWA 355 from interviews done with large 
American newspapers.146 The paper also printed editorials extolling the American media’s 
coverage of the hijacking.147 The most outright sign of support for the hijackers was the 
publishing of letters calling for monetary contributions toward the hijackers’ legal defense. The 
“Fund for Free Croatia,” wrote the appeal. The committee of the ‘Fund for Free Croatia’ 
included Father Slavko Slodo, a Croatian Franciscan and later editor of another publication by 
St. Jerome.148 The paper also later published a letter from Zvonko Bušić from prison, which both 
defended the hijackers’ action and called for funds for their defense.149  
 The paper continued to support the hijackers throughout their trial in Federal Court. 
During the trial, the paper referred the Julie Bušić as the queen of the hijacking.150 The paper 
also described the trial and the hijackers as, 
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 One of the most dramatic developments in Croatia's recent political history. Even if that 
 history is being played out thousands of kilometers away from Croatia, it is closer to 
 Croatia than anything that might be happening in Croatia itself. No one today strikes 
 so deeply at the Croatian heart like the testimonies of our young messengers of freedom 
 and human dignity. Nowhere is Croatia so convincingly accusing its prison 
 Yugoslavia, like here in Brooklyn.151 
The coverage by Danica in no ways represented the typical reaction to the event by Croatian-
Americans. Zajedničar, the official organ of the Croatian Fraternal Union reacted to the 
hijacking in a polar opposite manner. 
 The Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU) was established in Pittsburgh in 1894 originally as a 
“mutual benefit society” for Croatian steelworkers. It would grow to become one of the largest 
Croatian-American groups in the United States. The CFU established  Zajedničar in 1904. The 
paper was printed in both Croatian and English.152 During World War Two, Zajedničar 
promoted an ambigious policy towards Pavelić and the NDH. The paper promoted Yugoslav 
unity in its English-language section, while at the same time promoting Croatian independence in 
its Croatian-language section.153 Following the war, the paper “maintained a ‘neutral’ but 
obviously pro-regime outlook toward Yugoslavia.” 154  This shift was motivated by the changing 
demographics of the Croatian-American community. As the Croatian community in the United 
States grew older the organization shifted towards supporting the official U.S. Government 
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stance on Yugoslavia.155 The paper’s coverage of the hijacking echoed this shift.  
 Zajedničar was published weekly during the time of the hijacking. The first edition 
following the hijacking, on September 15, 1976, made no mention of the hijacking whatsoever. 
The paper's editors did not address the hijacking until the next issue, eleven days after the 
hijacking. The editors responded with a brief statement which read, 
 The Croatian Fraternal Union of America is a fraternal benefit society whose by- 
 laws strictly prohibit the Society from engaging in any political controversy. The  
 CFU, from its founders to the present day, is dedicated to the principle of   
 promoting citzenship in the U.S. and Canada among its members. The CFU is an  
 American organization of 110,000 members of Croatian or other Slav descent. As  
 a fraternal organization, we disclaim any connection with any unlawful   
 activities.156 
Following the statement, Zajedničar re-printed the editorial response of the Pittsburg Post-
Gazette, which denounced the hijacking as a “DEPLORABLE hijacking by Croatian 
terrorists.”157 While the CFU denounced the hijacking as a terrorist action, they offered far from 
the most denunciatory reaction to the hijacking. Quite predictably, that reaction came from the 
state media in Yugoslavia. 
 The state media in Yugoslavia immediately denounced the hijacking as a terrorist attack 
by Ustaše, and criticized the American government's reaction to the event. This reaction was 
seen in newspapers across Yugoslavia including in the Zagreb paper Vecerni List, which 
“expect[ed] vigorous steps” to curb Croatian extremism.158 The Yugoslav government also 
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directly criticized the American handling of the hijacking, claiming that the United States had 
veered away from their stated policy and negotiated with terrorists.159 While the official 
Yugoslav media reaction to the event was to immediately denounce the hijackers as fascist 
terrorists, the U.S. media’s reaction was more nuanced. 
 Three types of articles dominated the initial American coverage of the hijacking: 
background on the conflict between Croatia and Yugoslavia; passengers’ reactions to the 
hijacking; and portrayals of hijackers. In these three types of articles, the media established a 
nuanced and balanced reaction to the hijackings. These articles avoided extremes that Danica 
and the Yugoslav media portrayed. While the mainstream American media showed signs of 
sympathetic views about the hijackers, the coverage of the death of police officer Brian Murray 
and the hijackers’ subsequent trial overshadowed any sympathetic thoughts. 
 All of the major newspapers that published the hijackers’ manifestos produced stories on 
the background of the Croatian separatist movement. In these background articles, the media 
largely stayed away from directly labeling the hijackers as terrorists, instead choosing the less 
value-laden terms ‘nationalist’ or ‘hijackers.’ Most articles placed the event alongside the 
previous Croatian separatist terrorist action in Europe and South America, but also mentioned the 
long history of Croatian nationalism and Tito’s crackdown of the Croatian Spring.160 The 
newspapers produced balanced historical coverage of the event and its relevant history. The 
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idealistic nature of the hijackers was illuminated in articles based on interviews with passengers 
after the event, and stories on the hijackers themselves. 
 After the event, a number of the hostages spoke to the media and described the hijackers 
in a positive light. They described the Zvonko Bušić and his companions as “very polite,” and 
“nice guys,” that “didn’t want to hurt anybody.”161 Another passenger after the hijacking said, “I 
wish [the hijackers] well …They had nothing against us, but wanted only to get a story across. 
They were concerned for our welfare and we were treated well during most of it.”162 Other 
passengers were less receptive to the hijackers cause, including Bishop Edward O’Rourke who 
led the hostages on the plane in prayer during the ordeal.163 Hostage Richard Brockman’s article 
on the event captured the polarity of feelings that the hijacking forced on the hostages. In the 
article, he captured the range of emotions felt during the hijacking from fearing for his life when 
seeing a nervous man holding a ‘bomb’ to reading the leaflets of the hijackers and 
complimenting on how well they are written.164 The Los Angeles Times noted that sympathetic 
feelings were common for hostages after traumatic experiences.165 Printing sympathetic reactions 
from the passengers on TWA 355 was not the only way that the media covered the event in a 
sympathetic light.  
 Some news outlets also became enamored with the portrait of the hijackers as young 
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about six weeks after the hijacking. The first part of the series was titled “Julie Schultz- Just a 
nice girl from Portland.”166 The first part asked, “SIMPLY THUGS. Terrorists, revolutionaries. 
Bomb-throwing, card-carrying crazies, all of them right? Wrong. At least that’s not the picture 
you get when you look behind the headlines and talk to the people who know Julie Busic 
[sic].”167 The two-part profile included interviews with Julie’s family and friends and described 
Julie as a young woman deeply in love with a dedicated man, rather than as an extremist.168  
 Ultimately though, the tragic murder of police officer Brian J. Murray and the hijackers’ 
conviction in court overshadowed any positive sentiments that the hijackers young, idealistic-
charm could bring them. Four thousand police officers attended the funeral of the slain police 
officer. Mournful images accompanied the stories about the funeral, including images of 
Murray’s wife, Kathleen and officer Henry Dworkin, who was also injured when the bomb 
exploded.169 The media attention surrounding the hijacking died down by late October 1976, 
until the trial for the hijacking. The trial confirmed Zvonko as the mastermind of the operation, 
with some support from Julie, as they were both found guilty of air piracy resulting in a death, air 
piracy and conspiracy. The other hijackers standing trial, Peter Matanić and Frane Pešut, were 
aquitted on the charge of air piracy resulting in death, but were convicted of air piracy and 
conspiracy.170  	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 The media coverage of the hijacking illuminated the complex nature of the case. The 
Croatian-American press and the Yugoslav state press clearly chose sides in their reporting of the 
hijacking. The mainstream American media showed some sympathey for the Croatians case, 
through nuanced historical discussions of Croatian nationalism and positive portrayls of the 
hijackers. In the end, the tragic death of officer Murray and the hijackers' convictions in court 
overshadowed any sympathies for the hijackers. 
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CONCLUSION 
   In this paper, I have placed the Croatian separatist movement and the hijacking of 
TWA 355 in multiple contexts to better illuminate the unique nature of the hijacking of TWA 
355. By using the wave theory of David Rapoport, and the work of Bruce Hoffman and Brian 
Jenkins, I established the setting in which the goals and tactics of the Croatian separatist 
movement developed. The goal of national liberation for Croatia clearly originated in and echoed 
the sentiments of Rapoport’s second wave of terrorism. Both Zvonko Bušić and the other actors 
of the Croatian separatist movement utilized the tactics and technologies of Rapoport’s third 
wave of terrorism. Bušić differentiated his action from the broader Croatian separatist movement 
by attempting to harness the immense potential of an airplane hijacking to gain publicity for the 
Croatian national cause, in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the West. Other actors in the 
Croatian separatist movement lacked this goal of publicity and legitimacy in their actions, which 
focused on attacking symbols of the Yugoslav state. The application of Rapoport’s wave theory 
to the Croatian separatist movement and the hijacking of TWA 355 also illuminated the 
difficulties in establishing clearly defined waves of terrorism. The Croatian separatist movement 
clearly represents a case in which a group and its actions cannot be placed neatly within a 
prescribed wave of activity.  
 Through my discussion of the historical development of Croatian nationalism, the clear 
choices by the hijackers to attempt to associate with a specific variant of Croatian nationalism 
became evident. The hijackers shunned the negative historical connotations of Starčević, Pavelić 
and the NDH, in favor of espousing ties to the legacy of Stjepan Radić and the Croatian Spring.
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 Pavelić and the NDH, and in turn Starčević, due to his legacy’s co-optation during the NDH 
period, carry a strong negative historical connotation due to the wartime atrocities carried out in 
the NDH. The hijackers of TWA 355 chose to make no mention of these actors in their 
manifestos, instead invoking the legacies of Radić and the Croatian Spring, which carry 
significantly less historical baggage. The hijackers made this choice in hopes of gaining 
international legitimacy for the cause of Croatian independence. Other actors within the Croatian 
separatist movement did not share this goal of international legitimacy, nor did they attempt to 
distance themselves from the historical legacies of Starčević, Pavelić and the NDH. 
 The hijacking of TWA 355 was Zvonko Bušić’s attempt to cement his historical legacy 
within Croatian nationalism. While Bušić did have ties to Croatian separatist organizations, the 
hijacking should be viewed as an individual action, carried out by a man who felt a strong desire 
to establish himself as a Croatian revolutionary. The hijacking was Bušić’s answer to years of 
attempting to establish himself as a Croatian nationalist in both Europe and the United States. 
Bušić steadfastly believed that his fake bomb scheme and the two manifestos would enlighten 
the world to Croatia’s plight within Tito’s Yugoslavia. The reaction to the hijacking showed 
slight signs of sympathy towards Bušić’s claims, but ultimately the tragic death of officer Brian 
Murray put to rest any hopes for sympathy for Bušić and his co-conspirators. 
 The final question that needs to be addressed is did Bušić’s efforts have any effects on the 
realization of the re-creation of an independent Croatia? Ultimately, Bušić and the rest of the 
Croatian separatist movement fell victim to Cold War geopolitics. Yugoslavia’s placement as a 
communist country in Europe, outside of the Soviet sphere of influence left neither the Soviet 
Union, nor the United States with any desire the change the status quo in Yugoslavia. Without 
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support from either of the two superpowers of the Cold War, there was little hope for substantive 
change for Croatia until the geopolitics of the Cold War shifted. 
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APPENDIX 1: TEXT OF ‘DELCARATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 
CROATIAN NATIONAL LIBERATIONFORCES’171 
National self-determination is a basic human right, universal and fundamental, recognized by all members 
of the United Nations, a right which may not be denied or withheld any nation regardless of its territorial size or 
number of inhabitants. Only the inhabitants of an historically determined and limited territory can objectively and 
competently prescribe its future trends, and its own fate. Any force imposing itself against the desires of a nation can 
be termed nothing if not occupation, and, as is widely recognized, occupation is maintained exclusively by brutal 
force. 
 This universal, natural and human right is denied many nations, even from members of the United Nations, 
or, more appropriately, United Countries, which are obligated by their signatures to support and honor the principle 
of national self-determination. Croatia finds herself among these nations which are refused the right of self-
determination. 
 In today’s geopolitical terminology, and in the reality which this terminology represents, the name Croatia 
sounds strange, even disquieting. Wound around myths, fears, lies, and misunderstandings from the past, this name 
has either been pressed into intentional oblivion or forcefully denied. Consequently, today, in spite of its until 
recently uninterrupted thirteen century existence and legitimate continuity as a state, the Croatian state strikes one as 
being a legend, a fiction or a fantasy. Parallel with this intimidating world ignorance or silence, new peoples have 
appeared on the stage of contemporary history and new states have been established. From faraway places, where 
our journalists and scientists have written us of strange, wild tribes, new nations have arisen, native cultures have 
sprouted from virtually nothing. The independence of these newly created nations were extorted by force and 
established through a struggle for liberation. The awakening of national consciousness has currently become a deep 
spiritual process and the battle for freedom, which is a natural continuation of this process, has its basis in a 
fundamental moral principle and foundation. 
 Small nations know they are small, but rise up against the unjust consequences of this actuality: the 
ignoring of their significance, and the force applied to dictate their fates. Small nations affirm their national 
independence though fights for freedom, even with abductions, bombs and murders. The necessity for the 
acquisition of freedom is stronger and more just than the legality which powerful nations preach supporting their 
arguments for ruthless force and murderous weapons. 
 The actuality of national liberation, especially after World War II, has continually expressed itself through 
proportionate actions, on all sides. The Croatian nation, which is one of the oldest in Europe, cannot, nor desires, to 
further suppress its existence or to shirk its responsibility in the contemporary world, merely to preserve some vague 
imperialistic ‘peace’. Thus, discarding all biases and all exclusivism, squaring accounts with the mistakes and 
misunderstandings of the past, conscious of the fact that there exists no value more sacred than freedom and faith in 
one’s country, the Croatian nation commences once more its fight for freedom, emphasizing the following reasons 
for its active revival: 
 -After a full thirteen centuries of continuity as a legitimate state, Croatian state sovereignty was abolished. 
Through the artificial and forced Yugoslav-created state, the Croatian nation was subjected to the fascist-monarchy 
dictatorship of the Serbian kings. After the finish of the Second World War, unparalleled and unprecedented 
genocide was perpetrated upon the Croatian nation, under the banner of ‘brotherhood and unity,’ and in the name of 
integrationalistic Yugoslavism and gloomy, inhuman internationalism of the Hitler-Stalinistic caliber. The terror of 
the Serbian occupation subsided in 1966, only to be renewed in 1971 with an increasingly brutal countenance. 
-Croatians are oppressed, humiliated, and insulted because of their pride and national dignity. In their 
homes, as well as their homeland, they have no rights whatsoever, rather, are beset by difficult, unparalleled 
obligations. The Croatian moral and material possessions are disposed of in any way Belgrade deems appropriate. 
Through taxes and all resources from the land, Croatians must support the very system for which they are being 
sacrifices. 
-Besides the moral and historical obligations imposed, not, one rich, powerful country respects the 
recommendation of the General Committee of the United Nations to set apart 0.5% of its national income for use in 
under-developed countries. From the year 1945 and up until today, 8% of Croatian national income is extracted. 
According to evaluation by U.N. authorities, in every nation where 4% of its national income is systematically 
stripped, the biological and cultural growth of this nation is severely jeopardized.  
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-Through sheer force applied inside Yugoslav borders, and through material, military and intelligence 
support by the big powers of East and West, mismatched nations are held together in contradiction, coerced into an 
Serbian-dominated union, where mentalities, cultures, and systems are hostile to one another. Having already lived 
centuries of their distinct existences inside totally dissimilar states and cultural compounds, these nations have 
formulated their individual conceptions toward the world. Although they may utilize the same diction, the origin and 
basis of their intellectual expression renders these ideas incomprehensible to the other nations with which they live.  
-The total command staff of the Yugoslav military forces, serving inside Croatin [sic] national territory, is 
composed of members of the Serbian nation. Serbians constitute the wide majority of the police force in Croatia. 
Key positions in judicial bodies, administration, law, the Party, and the economy are likewise occupied by Serbs. 
Croatians who serve in these bodies are generally statistics without power, potency or influence. This unnatural and 
inhuman situation is maintained by force and cloaked in one motto: People’s Unity. This motto, which is continually 
repeated, is believed by nobody, not by the occupiers, nor the few quislings, regardless of how low they have fallen 
in their crimes and treason.  
-Croations [sic] are excluded from every decision; these decisions are merely related to them ‘after the 
fact’. 
-Today, when dialects of recently primitive tribes are being developed into new, modern languages, the 
Croatian grammar and orthography, which has been preserved on a monument from the year 1100, written in 
Croatian letters and language, is prohibited and burned. A frantic attack, unparalleled anytime or anyplace, is being 
waged against the Croatian language, resulting from the fact the language, among other values, is the center of moral 
instruction expanding dignity and freedom; the energy that resists and manipulations of one’s fate and one’s 
achievements. 
-The bearing of the Croation [sic] coat-of-arms, which was engraved on a Croatian stone monument dating 
from the ninth century, is equated with evil. 
-The singing of old patriotic, even sentimental Croatian songs is considered a conspiratorial, terroristic act, 
directed against the Yugoslav brotherhood of nations. 
-In a contrived manner, the natural growth of the Croatian population is being systematically reduced. 
Simultaneously, the most vital part of the Croatian population is, through economic exploitation, political pressure, 
and police terror, compelled to emigrate. Through this new form of genocide, a sustained and intentional 
extermination of the Croatian nation is being committed. 
-In all Yugoslav schools, the textbooks are represented as being the epitome of Serbian craftsmanship and 
historical-political reportage, th [sic] most authentic expression of the Serbian spirit, as appears in the canto by Peter 
Petrovic Niegos, where he sings of and praises the genocide upon the Muslim people, who have always been an 
integral part of the Croatian nation. 
-In the name of brotherhood, unity and socialism, a whip is cracked over the head of suffering Croatia. The 
sustained colonializion [sic] of the Croatian national entity is enforced through tested fascist-stalinistic methods. 
According to statistics from Amnesty International, the most well-known world organization concerned with 
political prisoners, there are more political prisoners in Yugoslavia or, more accurately in Croatia and Albanian 
Kosinet, than in any other East European land, excluding the Soviet Union, whose population numbers 250 million 
people. This statistic was openly confirmed on a TV interview by the Yugoslav dictator, Josip Broz Tito, at the 
occasion of his state visit in Sweden this year. Sentences of hard labor extended to twenty years and are often even 
transformed later to death sentences. Sophisticated, diverse, and bloody forms of torture are habitually the means by 
which prisoners are terrorized and confessins [sic] extracted. When necessary, the arrested are simply killed. 
-The reduction of freedom in the name of professed social aims is an everyday occurrence and reality. 
Disagreement, criticism; these are privileges which the occupying powers retain exclusively for themselves. This 
unnatural state of affairs is maintained and continued through use of court verdicts, abominations, self-criticisms, 
and liquidations, and, all too often, with the military and political assistance from western democratic lands. 
-It must also be emphasized that, since the 1918 creation of imperialistic Yugoslavia in Versailles, 
Croatians were, and remain, an undesirable element in Yugoslav diplomacy. As an illustration, let us consider the 
national composition of the Yugoslav embassy in Washington D.C. where the largest Yugoslav delegation in the 
world is stationed: 
Of twelve accredited diplomatic Yugoslav ambassadors in Washington, from the year 1970, eight are 
Serbian nationality, two are Slovenian, one is a Jew, and one a Montenegrin, not one Croatian. Of nineteen 
employees of the Washington Embassy in 1970, fifteen are Serbians, one is a Montenegrin, one is without 
nationality, and two are Croatian. (Mr. Ivan Perich and Miss Mira Blazevic, the chambermaid of one of the 
ambassador’s wives. Selecting chambermaids for ambassadors’’ wives from members of the occupied Croatian 
nation is not coincidental; it illustrates quite a bit). 
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All which we accomplish for ourselves is a question of duty, a question of active responsibility, a question 
of appealing to the United Nations and preserving in our fight for freedom and national independence. We raise the 
issue of Croatia as an issue of freedom. The world cannot be peaceful if the Croation [sic] nation is denied rights 
which are acknowledged by all people and all nations. Croatia is indispensible in the world today, while Yugoslavia, 
as a state, has no right to exist for the following reasons: 
-All large empires and multi-national state formations has sooner or later failed in their integrationalistic 
efforts regardless of whichever national ideologies or professed world missions are perpetuated or preached, simply 
because they offered no cultural or any other type of hypothesis for the harmonious evolution of those nations which 
they occupied or maintained by force of arms. Up to the present time, history has never recorded a single instance 
where a multi-national state entity has successfully and continuously solved a burning historical issue- the issue of 
acknowledging the independence and individual soverigny [sic] of all its nations. 
-The historical moral of all multi-national empires to the present time is: despotism fails, but never reforms 
itself. No democratic changes whatsoever are possible inside Yugoslavia, nor could these eventual changes be 
maintained. Yugoslavia can continue to exist for a certain time only as a police state, established on Serbian 
domination and fascist-stalinistic coercion. 
-Yugoslavia is impossible to defend with any generally recognized cotemporary legal or socio-
philosophical standpoint. Besides the fact that, inside Yugoslavia, a sustained genocidal politic is being perpetrated 
upon the Croatian nation, the Albanian nation is likewise biologically threatened. Belgrade holds, under its 
occupation, a large portion of Albanian national territory, on which virtually half of the Albanian population is 
settled. The Belgrade occupation forces also command a part of Bulgarian and Hungarian national territories. 
-Relative to its population, the education and technological capabilities of the Serbian nation are 
insufficient to subordinate the position of other nations within Yugoslavia. The Serbian nation is also becoming 
increasingly dissatisfied with and opposed to the imperialistic politics of its ruling clique. Serving as policeman in a 
foreign country is no honor. The majority of the Serbian nation is aware that he who fails to honor the rights of 
others loses ultimately his own entitled rights; for there is no freedom for he who deprives others. Consequently, the 
Croatian nation is not opposed to the Serbian nation or Serbian freedom; rather, to the totalitarianistic, imperialistic 
brutality of Great Serbianism, which, cloaked in a banner of ostensible freedom and deceptive imperialism, denies 
Croatia her right of independent existence and entitled freedom. 
-All Albanians, regardless of their individual political beliefs, desire and support consolidation with their 
homeland, Albania. In Yugoslavia, they are not only politically, but biologically threatened. In multi-national 
Yugoslavia, the Albanians are numerically the fourth, and, due to their high natality [sic] rate, will soon become the 
third largest nation. 
-In the event of any foreign aggression toward Yugoslavia, not one hundred persons from the Croatian 
nation could be found to fight and die voluntarily for Yugoslavia. 
-As Yugoslav history up to the present day clearly shows, and, as does the number of political prisoners in 
hard labor camps, Yugoslavia is materially and spiritually a great source of terrorism in Europe.  
-In contrast to its predatory neighbors in the East and West, the Croatian nation has never expressed any 
type of imperialistic tendency, not even when, at the beginning of the tenth century, the Croatian state’s number of 
inhabitants and military strength equaled England’s at this period. Then, and even in times of its greatest misfortune, 
Croatia has, through her culture, demonstrated her existence. Croatians made a meaningful contribution in the 
formation of contemporary civilization. Already in the eighteenth century, three Croatians were names as members 
of the French Academy: Anselmo Banduri byzantologist, antiquary and numismatologist; Lujo Nikoloc, astronomer, 
and Rudjer Bokovic, mathematician, astronomer [sic], and philosopher. From the middle-fifteenth to the mid-
seventeenth century, ten Croatian Muslims held the most responsible positions in the Turkish state government, 
military and foreign service, thus having a distinctive and powerful influence in the formation of Islam civilization 
and its universality. Croatia is the only nation in Europe having a large number of Islamic believers among its 
citizens and serves thus as the most natural and suitable bridge between the Eastern Byzantine world and the non-
Islam European states. 
-In spite of hundreds of battles with foreign occupiers, and the unequalled propaganda of genocidal 
Yugoslavism, the Croatian nation has succeeded in retaining eight percent of its entire population on its historical 
territory and, upon the return of millions of Croatian emigrants, this percentage will increase. The Croatian nation is 
not large but has earned, because of its participation in the formation and creation of contemporary civilization, its 
number of inhabitants, and its strategic geographical location, a meaningful place among other free, sovereign, and 
united nations of the world. From a total of 33 European states, 16 are smaller in their number of inhabitants than 
Croatia, and 18 are composed of smaller geographical areas. In Asia, 22 states have smaller populations, in Africa 
35, in South America, 7, in Central America, 11, in North America, 2, and even in Oceania, 2. 
	   61	  
-There is but one Croatian- Croatians number in the millions. Dispersed in all continents, residing in 
virtually all states and countries, Croatian emigrants, regardless of which part of the world they find themselves in, 
and which societal position they have occupied, cannot relate to one single country which as provided them refuge, 
until that moment when Croatia become free and sovereign. As a result, against their desires, they bring unrest into 
the entire world. The necessity to fight for Croatia arises from an obligation and duty toward the world and a 
responsibility toward one’s homeland. The Croatian nation is opposed to forced internationalism and state terror, but 
supports international human rights, freedom and responsibilities. 
-The sustained and radical colonization of the Croatian national territory could not transpire without 
injurious consequences on the economic development, on freedom, spiritual life, and creativity of other nations in 
Yugoslavia, and the power-holding Serbian intellectuals comprehend and affirm this view: 
The spiritual life of the Yugoslav nations is manipulated through the most banal issues of power, the 
national product is used up as soon as it is produced, and the historical reality of this land cannot be defined by any 
other perspective but an accumulation of crises, convenient for those in power, but very dangerous for the culture, 
without which we cannot survive. We possess a backward agriculture, an industry which cannot compete with 
others, a low productivity, which is daily decreasing, a poor, disorganized standard of hygiene, education which 
belongs to the nineteenth century, massive illiteracy, unemployment, export of work forces, and import of capital, 
sudden enrichment of a small number of individuals, and the widespread impoverishment of the national masses, 
hyperproduction of capital delinquency, prostitution, and corruption, the lie as a means of communication, a falsified 
system of information. This is not capitalism, this is not socialism, this is a deceptive vegetation from the dregs of a 
half-barbaric form of European civilization, with a propensity for the most savage repercussions. 
We have stressed the principal reasons for our dissatisfaction with this impose state unity and loss of 
freedom, and now we will carry out the fundament designs of our struggle, in which we shall preserve to our last 
breath and ultimate victory, sharing the hopes and fears of the world, and accepting our part and responsibility in its 
destiny. 
We are fighting for the united national Croatian state, in which Croatian sovereignty is indivisible, 
inalienable and in perpetual force. For the national minorities which live together with the Croatian nation in one 
union, and in one and the same homeland, the united, indivisible, inalienable sovereignty of the Croatian nation is 
the primary and inviolable basis of their common history, and political and legal constitution, which, 
understandably, assumes a correct and unavoidable recognition and guarantee of equality to all, in rights and in 
responsibilities, regardless of nationality, religion, race or political beliefs. 
We present the Croatian issue as the issue of freedom, of a new form of cooperation. Croatia, in our 
conception, is a state of free people and a just society, outside of all ideological, political, economic and military 
blocs, a willing meeting-place of East and West. Croatia is not up for bids in an international auction block, but, 
rather, play an integral part in the destiny of the world, and, consequently, we fight for Croatia, which will be, for all 
people, either a cherished presence or a beloved homeland. 
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APPENDIX 2: TEXT OF ‘APPEAL TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE’172 
 The American people, in 1776, proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence that every nation has a right 
to national self-determination and freedom, and this declaration, which inspired later the protagonists of the French 
Revolution in their formulation of the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man,’ has served as a model to many other 
nations throughout the years, which have strived to free themselves from colonialistic or imperialistic forces. 
 “One can truly say world decolonization began when the original 13 colonies proclaimed independence 
from Great Britain. Later, Woodrow Wilson perpetuated this guiding principle in American policy, stating his 
support for national self-determination of nations at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, a position that 
America, in 1941, in the Atlantic Charter, continued to support and honor. 
 “According to various persons in influential government positions, this philosophy continues, theoretically, 
to be adhered to in questions of American policy. The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, stated recently, as quoted 
in the New York Times, April 28, 1976, that ‘there can be no doubt that the United States remains committed to the 
principles of its Declaration of Independence. We support self-determination. 
 “These are the reigning principles included in the United Nations Charter, and provide the basis upon 
which the politics of the United Nations should rest. 
 “At the 25th anniversary convention of the United Nations, this declaration, which succinctly detailed and 
formulated the inalienable right of national self-determination, was unanimously accepted. In principle, the 
inviolable right of nations who are legitimately entitled to, but denied self-determination, is upheld, even to the 
extent that an armed resistance is necessary. 
 “Unfortunately, memorandums sent all over the world reporting of the unbearable economic, cultural, and 
political exploitation in Croatia were, for the most part, ignored. Recently, however, the State Department replied to 
one of these. The reply read that the United States would in the future support and respect that “integrity and unity 
of the state of Yugoslavia.” We have also been informed that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sent a letter, with 
these same constraints, to Yugoslavia.  
 “This letter was read aloud before the Yugoslav Presidium, providing this artificial government with 
additional support in the continuation of its oppressive policies, which are the epitome of “Great Serbianism,” 
totalitarianism, Stalinism, and Nazi terror. 
 “Thus, the United States supports the colonialistic enslavement of the non-Serbian nations within 
Yugoslavia. An ugly paradox arises when one realizes that the theoretical and practical applications of American 
support for self-determination are in direct opposition to one another. 
 “Democratic and Communist countries alike, or more accurately, their governments, often justify the use of 
force upon smaller nations with the same terminology, even utilizing the identical terminologies of Hitler, Mussolini, 
and other Nazi ideologues and theoreticians. 
 “It is difficult to criticize many American politicians, and especially the American people, for the fact that 
the official U.S. politics show no awareness of or sympathy for the desires of small, occupied nations. This is quite 
clear and comprehensible to those who have an understanding of American history, since America, in her entire 200-
year history, has never once experienced any form of national problems, problems which Europe and other parts of 
the world have known and continue to encounter.  
 “As one illustration, which all who are familiar with the exact situation in Yugoslavia can comprehend, let 
us make an interesting and instructive analogy.  
 “Yugoslavia, or translated, South Slavia, is a product of forced consolidation; created by the Big Powers, of 
the southern Slav nations: Croatians, Serbians, Slovenians, Macedonians, and Montenegrins, and, thus, is the 
quintessence of terror, a continuing ideological and expansionist hoax. 
 “If the formation of South Slavia has solved the problems between the southern Slav nations, and created 
an “historical ideal” through this forced consolidation, why should not the Big Powers follow this glowing example, 
in the Middle East, as in South Slavia, a purportedly voluntary union of Syrians, Palestinians, Jews, Jordanians, 
Libyans, and Egyptians? 
 “Through the creation of a unified state, the Middle East section of the State Department would, then, to 
avoid further headaches in this area, merely appoint one of these nations as the ruling force, (as Serbs are in South 
Slavia), with supreme authority over all the other nations, and supply this chosen nation with all the weapons 
necessary to defend the new state from any opposition, or to impose its will on the others.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172Text printed as in “Text of ‘Croatian Fighters,’” New York Times, September 11, 1976. 
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 “This ludicrous idea would find no support from any faction or government whatsoever, but, nevertheless, 
total support for South Slavia is often all too apparent. If South Slavia is not a criminal and political absurdity, then 
the Middle East State would be even less! 
 “We decided to undertake this particular action for many reasons. First, our goal was to present an accurate 
picture of the brutal oppression taking place in Yugoslavia. When the eventual uprising against Serbian Imperialism 
begins, the American people will not, then, allow themselves to be further manipulated regarding the justifications 
of such an occurrence.  
 “Next, we decided on this method in order to illustrate the idea that there indeed exists, nobler values that 
the preservation of a bloody, totalitarianistic, and imperialistic creation. Is freedom for Croatians less important, or 
necessary than the freedom of other nations? 
 “Croatians have optimistically attempted, many times, to effect legal changes in the oppressive political 
climate of Yugoslavia. Stjepan Radich, founder of the Croatian Peasant Party and a confirmed pacifist, was 
assassinated in the Belgrade Parliament in 1928. In the spring of 1971, the Croatian Communist Central Committee, 
head by Miko Tripalo and Dr. Savka Dapcevic-Kucar, were, with the full support of Washington and Moscow, 
purged militarily from power by the Belgrade government. 
 “Thousands and thousands of Croatians were imprisoned, without even attempting to calculate the number 
who emigrated as a result. 
 “We hold no illusions that Serbian imperialism will allow (as imperialism by its very nature prohibits this) 
the Croatian national self-determination: we hold no illusions that it shall understand in the future, as it has failed in 
the past, any methods of resistance excluding those it itself employed in the occupation of Croatia and in the 
maintenance of this occupation.  
 “The final question which comes to mind is then: Why was an American aircraft taken? The United States 
has systematically provided the Belgrade regime with billions of dollars of economic and military aid, as outright 
gifts, regardless of the fact that Yugoslavia is a multinational state, and the weapons intended to prevent outside 
invasion would not, in the event of internal unrest, be used against a foreign aggressor.  
 “The non-Serbian nations would, under no circumstances, defend Yugoslavia against any invader, from the 
East of the West, but, rather would use the first opportunity to obtain national independence. 
 “The United States, as recently stated in The New York Times, prohibits the selling of arms to states who 
do not support basic human rights. This is yet another striking example of the discrepancy between the theoretical 
and practical application of U.S. policy. 
 “This, then, was the only possible method to employ in appealing to the American people to protest the 
sending of any form of aid to the imperialistic Belgrade regime. The 3 million Americans of Croatian descent, who 
have fulfilled their obligations as U.S. citizens, militarily, economically and especially politically, have a moral right 
to demand a radical change in the American policies regarding occupied Croatia. 
 “We expect all ‘peace-loving’ forces in the world to describe us as terrorists, criminals and murderers. 
From the time of Caesar, through Hitler, Stalin, France and Salazar, as well as with numerous other colonial and 
neo-colonial governments, those fighting for national liberation have always been described in such terms. 
 “The point to be made here, obviously, is not to conclusively define “terrorism,” an impossible and 
unnecessary task, but, rather, to explain the ultimate necessity for our extreme decision and to ask others to judge 
this decision objectively and unemotionally. 
 “Recently, a U.N. diplomat expressed this idea, stating that today, only a small number of diplomats had 
never been imprisoned or convicted of terrorism or criminal acts. One man’s terrorist is another man’s patriot, 
depending solely on one’s national and political objectives and suitability. 
 “We must remember that today’s ‘terrorists’ are often tomorrow’s policy-makers, having participated in the 
formation of a new, independent state. Such was the position of the supporters of the Declaration of Independence, 
after the American colonies were freed from British subjugation. Thus, the unsuccessful continue to be ‘terrorists,’ 
but, upon success, are courted by all governments. With this reality reappearing dependably from one day to the next, 
all ethical and moral revulsions felt for so-called “terrorist” acts is necessarily irrational. 
 “Illegal actions against government take place in every country, regardless of the government system. 
However, where a possibility for constructive change through legal channels exists, a forum for discussion, and an 
opportunity to publicize one’s dissatisfaction, violence, and terror is rarely condoned, and groups practicing violence 
under such conditions rarely enjoy any popular base of support. Thus, fringe groups such as the S.L.A., [Sybionese 
Liberation Army] the New World Liberation Front, or the Red Guerrilla Family may succeed in getting publicity, 
but fail even to recruit enough members or sympathy to realize their aims. 
 “In countries where no opportunity for democratic change, peaceful lobbying, or publication of one’s views 
exists, another method must necessarily be utilized. Sean McBride, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, expressed this 
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idea well: “If oppression amounts to genocide… people are entitled to fight back. The framers of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights recognized that in the Declaration, they pointed out that unless human rights are 
protected under the rule of law, people will be drive to violence.” 
 “Aware of the fact that violence, even when justified, still temporarily evokes fear and revulsion in some of 
the populace, we shall use as little violence as possible to achieve our demands. As these demands are quite easily 
fulfilled and involve nothing more that disseminating accurate information; all should run smoothly and come to a 
satisfactory conclusion. If our goal is accomplished, we gladly accept all punishment and consider these ideas 
worthy of suffering for.  
 “The failure of our demands to be met would result in actions which would rightly lie not on our 
consciences, but on those of the people in a position to meet such trivial demands. 
 “We have undertaken this action in the utmost seriousness, conscious of all its possible consequences and 
far-reaching effect on world peace.  
 “Send all critiques or support to this address: Croatia Press POB 1767, Grand Central, New York, N.Y. 
10017.” 
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